The use of ethnicity as a factor for demarcating municipalities: the case of Malamulele
and Vuwani communities. by Mokgopo, Tshehledi Isaac
Research Paper 
University of the Western Cape 
Research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the LLM in Law, State and Multilevel 
Government 
 
Student     : Adv. Tshehledi Isaac Mokgopo 
Student Number    : 3601012 
Mode      : LLM (Structured) 
Supervisor     : Prof N Steytler 
 
Research Paper Topic: 
The use of ethnicity as a factor for demarcating municipalities: the case of Malamulele 
and Vuwani communities. 
 
Key words: Demarcation, Amalgamation, Ethnicity, Ethiopia, Local Government, 
Service Delivery, Protests, Municipality, Malamulele, Vuwani, Conflict, Apartheid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
i 
 
Declaration by Student 
I, Tshehledi Isaac Mokgopo hereby declare that ‘The use of ethnicity as a factor for 
demarcating municipalities: The case of Malamulele and Vuwani communities’ at 
the University of the Western Cape, hereby submitted, has not been previously submitted 
by me for any other degree at this or any other university. I further declare that this is my 
own original work; and that all the sources which were used or quoted in this study have 
been duly indicated and acknowledged as complete references 
…………………………………….………… 
Tshehledi Isaac Mokgopo 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
ii 
 
Declaration by Supervisor 
I, Professor Nico Steytler, hereby declare that this research paper by Tshehledi Isaac 
Mokgopo for the degree of Law, State and Multilevel Government (LLM Programme) be 
accepted for examination.                                     
.....…………………………………….. 
Prof N Steytler 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
iii 
 
Dedication 
This study is dedicated to the following people: my lovely parents, Phineas Tshigivha 
Libago and Raesetja Rosina Mokgopo; my uncle’s family, Phushudi Rufus Mokgopo and 
his wife Sebolelo Salphina Mokgopo; to my blessed siblings, Samuel, Maebe, Martin, 
Themby, Rendy Mokgopo; to Pleasure Thobakgale and my precious stone, Moemeloa 
Godsend.  
It is also dedicated to the following people who have departed to be with the Lord: my late 
aunt Masilo Jeridah Mokgopo whom I lost mysteriously, also my late uncle Nyonkoloza 
Phillip Mokgopo who loved me dearly like his own son and my late beloved grandmother 
Keribe Ramatsobane (Ngwana Mogale) Sarah Mokgopo who raised my elder brother and 
I to be the responsible men that we are today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
To God the creator of heaven and earth, you have fulfilled the words which you have 
spoken to me in 2012: Call unto me, I will answer you, and show you great and mighty 
things which you do not know of.  You have succeeded in answering yet another 
academic prayer. Indeed you are the God who answers prayers. I thank you for the 
wisdom and the strength that you have given me to complete this master’s degree and 
this research paper.  
My sincere gratitude goes to the man behind this brains; my supervisor, Professor Nico 
Steytler for his expert advice, guidance, patience, support and motivation. To me you 
were not only my supervisor but became a father away from home. You were strategically 
sent from heaven to feed the world with knowledge and understanding. Through your 
guidance I made it and I told you that by the time I finish this work I would be a better 
person, indeed I am a changed being. Thank you very much for awarding me the bursary 
to complete this study. Thank you very much for using your academic horn to anoint me. 
Your scholarly ink is mightier than a warrior’s sword.  
My gratitude further goes to Ms Nicky Van Driel for her excellent work in editing and 
proofreading this research. Thank you very much. I pray that the good Lord richly bless 
you and your family. 
I would also like to thank my beloved parents, my father Mr. Phineas Libago and my 
mother Ms. Rosina Mokgopo for the pillars they are continuing to be in my life. There was 
a time when life became so difficult that I decided to quit my academic journey to look for 
employment due to financial constraints but you never allowed me to do that. You made 
sure that you played your role as parents to ensure that I complete all my undergraduate 
and postgraduates degrees. For that reason, I could not have chosen any better parents 
except you. I will always be indebted to you.  
To my big brother Samuel Mokgopo and younger brother Martin and Rendy Mokgopo 
thank you for always being there and wishing me well in your prayers. To my beautiful 
little sisters Maebe and Themby Mokgopo, I know it was not easy to have an absent 
brother but all this was worth it. Thank you very much for all your prayers, for it was 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
v 
 
because of you that I persevered up to this far. To Pleasure Thobakgale you gave me 
hope while I had none left and for that reason I thank you, thank you for your unconditional 
love, support, patience and encouragement.  
To my uncle’s family: Phushudi Rufus and Sebolelo Salphina Mokgopo thank you very 
much for your tremendous contribution to my studies. You made sure that I become what 
God wants me to be. Thank you very much for your support and financial contribution in 
my studies and I pray that God bless you more for your generosity. 
It would be an error to forget my beloved brother Mogau Sekgala who stood by me 
through this challenging programme by encouraging me and always making sure that we 
submit our work on time. How can I forget the man who brought this information about 
this programme to me, Isaiah Matipe Sefoka, big brother I made it through your 
unconditional love and unselfishness with information. To all of you I pray that God 
blesses you more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
vi 
 
Abbreviations 
CDDR:  Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of States, Provinces and Regions  
EPRDF:  Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front  
LP:   Limpopo Province 
LG:   Local Government 
MDB:  Municipal Demarcation Board 
MDTT:  Malamulele Demarcation Task Team  
MEC:  Member of Executive Council 
NCOP:  National Council of Provinces 
RSA:  Republic of South Africa 
SALGA:  South African Local Government Association 
TBVC:  Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei 
TGE:  Transitional Government of Ethiopia  
TPLF:  Tigray People’s Liberation Front  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
vii 
 
Table of contents 
Declaration by student ………………………………………………………………………….i 
Declaration by supervisor………………………………………………………………………ii  
Dedication...……………………………………………………………………………………..iii 
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………………….iv  
Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………………vi 
 
Chapter One: Introduction………..…………………………………………………………..1 
1.1. Problem statement…………………………………………………………………..1 
1.2. Research questions……………..…………………………………………………..4 
1.3. Argument……………………………………………………………………………..4 
1.4. Literature review……………………………………………………………………..6 
1.4.1. Municipal demarcation……………………………………………………………...6 
1.4.2. Accommodation of ethnicity………………………………………………………...9 
1.4.3. Violent protests as a form of political participation………………………………12 
1.4.4. The use of ethnicity as a factor in determining municipal boundaries…………14 
1.5. Chapter outline……………………………………………………………………..15 
1.6. Methodology………………………………………………………………………..15 
 
Chapter Two: Municipal Demarcation Tensions: the case of Vuwani and 
Malamulele…………………………………………………………………………………….16 
2.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………...16 
2.2. Malamulele and Vuwani municipal demarcation………………………………17 
2.2.1. Malamulele……………………………………………………………………17 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
viii 
 
2.2.2. Vuwani…………………………………………………………………………22 
3. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………..25 
 
Chapter Three: The Municipal Demarcation Process in South Africa….……………27 
3.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………27 
3.2. Demarcating provincial boundaries……………………………………………....27 
3.3. Demarcating local boundaries…………………………………………………….28 
3.3.1 Initial demarcation: pre-1995……………………………………………………...28 
3.3.2 Demarcation post-1995…………………………………………………………...29 
3.4. Role players in demarcation process………………………………………….....31 
3.5.  The objectives of the MDB and demarcation criteria…………………………...32 
3.6. Factors to be taken into consideration……………………………………………32 
3.7. Municipal Demarcation process…………………………………………………..33 
3.7.1. Public notification of determination of municipal boundaries………………33 
3.7.2. Community/Public participation and consideration by the MDB…………...34 
3.7.3. Formal investigation and the power to investigate by the committee……...35 
3.7.4. Objections against the MDB’s decision and consideration of the objections 
by the MDB……………………………………………………………………..35 
3.8. Critical analysis of whether ethnicity could be considered as a factor in terms 
of section 25…………………………………………………………………..........36 
3.9. The demarcation process: traditional leaders response…………………….....38 
3.10. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….40 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
ix 
 
Chapter Four: The use of ethnicity in Ethiopia in determining internal 
boundaries………………………………………………………………………………..…...42 
4.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..42 
4.2. Historical transition of Ethiopia………………………………………………………..43 
4.3. The creation of regions in Ethiopia……………………………………………………44 
4.4. Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia…………………………………………………………….46 
4.4.1. Boundary related ethnic conflicts……………………………………………………..47 
4.4.2. Competition over limited resources…………………………………………………..50 
4.4.3. Power sharing conflicts………………………………………………………………..52 
4.4.4. Conflicts between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities………………………………..53 
4.4.5. Language and political tension………………………………………………………..54 
4.5. Ethnic local governments in Ethiopia…………………………………………………54 
4.6. Challenges, ethnic tensions and conflicts at local level in Ethiopia……………......61 
4.6.1. Land disputes at the local government level…………………………………………61 
4.6.2.  Minority exclusion in employment…………………………………………………...64 
4.6.3. Political privileges……………………………………………………………………...64 
4.6.4. The challenges of establishing ethnic boundaries in Ethiopia……………………..65 
4.7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...65 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations….………………………………….70 
5.1. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...…68 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
x 
 
References…………………………………………………………………………………….76 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem statement 
In 1994, South Africa became a democratic country after many decades of resistance 
against apartheid. In 1996, the Constitution which is the supreme law of the country was 
adopted and provides for three spheres of government namely national, provincial and 
local. The Constitution emphasise  that South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, and non-racialism and non-sexism.1  
With regard to the establishment of municipalities the Constitution requires an 
independent body to demarcate municipal boundaries.2 As a result the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) was adopted to give 
effect to section 155 of the Constitution which established the Municipal Demarcation 
Board (MDB).3 Section 3 of the Act provides that the MDB is a juristic person, 
independent, impartial and must perform its function without prejudice, fear or favour.4 
The most important function of the MDB is to determine municipal boundaries in 
accordance with the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 
1998) and other appropriate legislation enacted in terms of Chapter 7 of the Constitution.  
In 2000, the MDB demarcated 284 municipalities and the first full democratic local 
government elections took place on 5 December 2000 establishing the constitutionally 
designed system of local government. Not all citizens were happy with boundary 
                                                             
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Chapter 9 “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy”. 
3 Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998. 
4 Section 3 Municipal Demarcation Act. 
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determinations by the MDB.5 In 2009, the MDB minimized the number of municipalities to 
278.6  
The South African government has been at the receiving end of a wave of protests 
associated with lack of or poor service delivery around the country. On 21 September 
2013, residents of the small town of Malamulele which falls under the Thulamela Local 
Municipality went on the rampage after a MDB meeting and torched municipal property. 
This was because the residents of Malamulele were demanding a separate municipality 
and their request was refused by the MDB.7 Thulamela and Makhado Local Municipalities 
which falls under the Vhembe District Municipality have two different ethnic groups in their 
areas namely, Venda- and Tsonga-speakers.  Currently, the Thulamela Local Municipality 
head office is situated in Thohoyandou which has mainly Venda-speaking people. The 
sitting arrangements of these two communities emanates from the spatial impact of land 
reform and the redrawing of internal boundaries on South Africa’s former Bantustans.8  
In 2014, the MDB was taken to task as it experienced a serious challenge to its work as 
service delivery protests changed to protests about municipal boundary demarcation. 
This took place when the community of Malamulele in Limpopo went on the rampage and 
destroyed government buildings and barricaded the roads. The residents of Malamulele 
wanted their own separate municipality away from the Thulamela Local Municipality, 
which is located in a Venda-speaking community. The MDB took the resolution not to give 
the community its own municipality because it did not want to establish municipalities with 
ethnic boundaries.9  
                                                             
5 Cogta ’15 Year Review of Democratic and Developmental local Government in Gauteng: Reflecting on Local 
Government Performance in Gauteng for the period of 2000-2016’ Available at http://www.cogta.gpg.gov.za 
(accessed 27 July 2016). 
6 Mashamaite K ‘Public Service Protests in a Democratic South Africa: A Dilemma for Local Municipalities’ (2004) 5 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 233.   
7 Baloi J ‘Malamulele calm after rampage’ SABC News 31 January 2015 Available at http://www.sabc.co.za/news 
(accessed 19 July 2016).  
8 Ramutsindela M ‘Resilient geographies: land, boundaries and the consolidation of the former bantustans in post-
1994 South Africa’ (2007) 173 The Geographical Journal 43-44. 
9 Makamu N ‘Malamulele Municipality: Tribalism or Administrative Justice?’ City Press 14 January 2015 available at 
http://www.news24.com/mynews24/malamulele-municipality-tribalism-or-administrative-justice (accessed 13 
August 2016). 
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However, a new municipality was created which included parts of Makhado. In 2015, the 
MDB took the decision to move some of the communities from Vuwani who were Venda-
speaking, so as to incorporate them into the new Malamulele Municipality. This decision 
led to serious protests which saw the community of Vuwani burning 29 schools in the 
community and nearby communities.  As a result of an on-going protest in Vuwani many 
people’s lives were affected, mainly the school learners as the schools in the area were 
burned down.  
The main reason for the burning of schools in Vuwani was because most of the 
community members alleged that they were not consulted when the decision to 
incorporate them within the new Malamulele municipality was taken.10  
Ethnicity proved to be a serious issue for the MDB in determining and re-determining 
municipal boundaries in South Africa. The recent Malamulele and Vuwani saga in 
Limpopo saw the MDB faced with a serious problem as to whether to consider ethnicity 
as a deciding factor in establishing municipalities in the country.  The community of 
Malamulele wanted its own municipality away from the Thulamela District Municipality 
whereas the Vuwani community on the other hand refused to be incorporated into the 
new Malamulele Municipality due to consultation issues, ethnic reasons and the fear of 
not receiving proper municipal services.11 Ethnic diversity is of more concern as the 
community of Vuwani refused to be part of the new Malamulele Municipality by stating 
that they are comfortable with where they are currently situated which is in Vhembe 
District under the Makhado Municipality and that they did not want to be mixed with the 
Xitsonga-speaking people.12  
 
                                                             
10 Tau P ‘More schools on fire in Vuwani as police try to control growing crowds’ City Press 05 May 2016 Available 
at http://city-press.news24.com/News/more-schools-on-fire-in-vuwani-as-police-try-to-control-growing-crowds-
20160505 (accessed 23 August 2016).  
11 Tshikudo E ‘We are not part of Malamulele!’ Limpopo Mirror 27 July 2015 Available at 
https://limpopomirror.co.za/articles/news/32225/2015-07-27/awe-are-not-part-of-malamulelea (accessed 27 
August 2016).  
12 Magubane K ‘We don't want tribalism in Vuwani‚ says minister’ Sowetan 11 May 2017 Available at 
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2017/05/11/we-don-t-want-tribalism-in-vuwani-says-minister (accessed 15 
May 2017).  
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1.2. Research Questions 
The questions to be addressed in this study are as follows: Should ethnicity be used as 
a factor in demarcating municipalities in South Africa? If, so does the present Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) allow for such 
accommodation?   If ethnicity is used as a deciding factor will it not divide the country 
bearing in mind the past apartheid experiences? Thus, what are the pros and cons of 
using ethnicity as a factor in determining municipal boundaries? In answering the latter 
question, reference will be made to Ethiopia where local government demarcation is 
explicitly done on the basis of ethnicity.  
 
1.3. Argument 
Though the South African Constitution does not recognise the use of ethnicity as a factor 
for determining municipal boundaries, the recent protests by members of the community 
shows that ethnicity is starting to play a role in determining boundaries in South Africa. 
This means that the use of ethnicity in determining and re-determining municipalities must 
be treated equally to other factors that must be observed in the demarcation process.  
There is a fear that if ethnicity is recognised in determining municipal boundaries that that 
recognition will result in ethnic conflicts by the members of the community because no 
boundary is totally inclusive of one ethnic group. The question of what will happen to 
internal minorities is also running through the minds of many people. But by looking at 
how the communities in Limpopo Province are situated, language speaks volumes in 
differentiating between the three ethnic groups which are situated in the province.13  There 
is always a particular ethnic group which is dominating in a particular place, such as in 
Venda where Venda-speaking people are the majority, in Giyani, Tsonga-speaking 
                                                             
13 Masondo D ‘But by looking at how the communities in Limpopo Province are situated, language speaks volume 
in differentiating between the three ethnic groups which are situated in the province.’ Politics web 25 March 2015 
Available at http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/tribalism-language-and-the-national-question-in-po  
(accessed 17 July 2016) 
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people are in the majority and in Polokwane with Sepedi-speaking people being in the 
majority.14 
Therefore, the recognition of ethnicity in the demarcation process will not prejudice 
minorities as they will be incorporated within the boundaries of that particular ethnic group 
that they find themselves in. For example, if a certain minority group happens to find itself 
within the territory of another dominating ethnic group then such minority will be served 
by the same municipality which is serving the dominant ethnic group. This is to say, for 
example, due to work opportunities in Polokwane, there is always a large number of 
Venda- and Tsonga-speaking people leaving their communities to come to Polokwane. 
Some end up building or buying houses there and as a result they end up forming part of 
the Polokwane Local Municipality and even today, as observed, there is no ethnic conflict, 
which means that people might be satisfied with the boundaries in which they find 
themselves in. 
It should be noted that the only disadvantage of using ethnicity in determining municipal 
boundaries, which could result in ethnic conflict will be where communities are not 
provided with proper municipal services by the dominating ethnic group as it was alleged 
by Malamulele community. However, on the other hand, the use of ethnicity in 
determining municipal boundaries will provide many communities with their own 
municipalities and ensures that municipal services are provided equally to all communities 
including rural communities in South Africa. Pursuant to that the use of ethnicity in 
demarcating municipal boundaries will result in different ethnic communities having direct 
access to municipal services in their areas and this will limit service delivery protests as 
observed in the Malamulele community. Ethnicity will then be used as a yardstick for 
assessing the ability of the municipality in taking care of the communities and it will reduce 
the pointing of fingers by other ethnic groups as they will have their own municipal offices 
within their boundaries.  
                                                             
14 Masondo D ‘Tribalism, language and the national question in post-apartheid SA’ Politicsweb 25 March 2015 
Available http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/tribalism-language-and-the-national-question-in-po at 
(accessed 17 July 2017).  
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The recognition of ethnicity should not be viewed as a step closer to dividing the country 
but it should be seen as a response to the problems and tensions faced by the MDB when 
carrying out its demarcation functions due to the fact that some provinces in South Africa 
have different ethnic groups that are situated according to their cultures and language in 
one province, e.g. Limpopo and Mpumalanga. By recognising and using ethnicity as a 
factor in demarcating municipalities this should assist the MDB as communities shall be 
satisfied and people would reside according to their ethnic groups. This is because people 
of the same language and cultural background tend to understand each other more and 
live in peace than in a mixed ethnic diversity which eventually results in ethnic conflict.15  
 
1.4. Literature review 
1.4.1.  Municipal demarcation 
In 1994 when the new democratic government of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
came into power it was faced with a major restructuring of government and the adoption 
of the new Constitution. This required total transformation of the three spheres of 
government because apartheid had left its mark on South African human settlements and 
municipal institutions. De Visser states that local government in South African has 
emerged or came up from being an institution that was racist, illegitimate and subservient 
to an institution with a leadership that is democratically elected which has a 
developmental agenda as well as a constitutional status.16 This means that transformation 
requires deep understanding of the historical role of local government in creating and 
perpetuating local separation and inequity as well as the impact of apartheid on municipal 
institutions.17  
Tsatsire, Raga, Taylor and Nealer highlight that the influx control of Blacks in urban areas 
as well as racial segregation and disenfranchisement of certain racial groups 
characterised the history of local government during the apartheid era (1948-1993). They 
                                                             
15 Eller JD ‘Ethnicity, Culture, and "The Past"’ (1997) 37 available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.act2080.0036.411 (accessed 23 July 2016). 
16 De Visser J ‘Developmental Local Government in South Africa: Institutional fault Lines’ 2009 Commonwealth 
Journal of Local Governance, Issue 2 pp.8.  
17 The White Paper on Local Government 9 March 1998. 
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highlight further that the South African local government became the mechanism and 
instrument through which racial and cultural groups were divided and kept apart. This is 
the main reason why racial transformation in local government structures was required in 
South Africa on the demise of apartheid.18 
Ramutsindela and Simon highlight that “after the re-integrated of the Bantustans into 
South Africa, the restoration of South African citizenship to residents of the so-called 
TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) in 1992-1993, and the 
adoption of an interim constitution in 1993, a political environment was created in which 
the internal map of South Africa could be redrawn afresh in accordance with the 
envisaged principles of a non-racial democracy”.19 As a result the process of demarcating 
regions and renaming them into provinces followed in 1994. 
According to Ramutsindela,  
this process of demarcating and renaming of regions meant that the areas of the 
former Bantustans were kept intact within the provinces into which they were 
incorporated.20 This is so because the intention to keep a particular language 
group together meant that ethnic language groups should continue to occupy the 
very same space within which they were confined under the apartheid government. 
In practice, the new provinces have accommodated and maintained the same 
linguistic and ethnic maps which existed during the apartheid era as the 
fundamental bases for spatial organization in a democratic South Africa. The 
demarcation of provinces/regions did not divide any of the former Bantustans into 
more than one province. Instead, it has strengthened the concentration of 
language groups into particular provinces, thereby keeping and maintaining the 
apartheid status quo of the distribution of those groups.21 
                                                             
18 Tsatsire I, Raga K, Taylor J D, & Nealer E ‘Historical overview of specific local government transformatory 
developments in South Africa’ 2009 New Contree 133. 
19 Ramutsindela M R & Simon D ‘The Politics of Territory and Place in Post-apartheid South Africa: the Disputed 
Area of Bushbuckridge’ (1999) 25 Journal of Southern African Studies 479. 
20 Ramutsindela M (2007) 49-50. 
21 Ramutsindela M (2007) 49. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
8 
 
It is worth noting that the demarcation process which redrew municipal boundaries across 
South Africa during that time/period was aimed at  achieve uniformity in the local 
government structures on the basis of building functional boundaries and ensuring a 
sustainable service delivery as well as cohesive physical and environmental areas with 
financial viability within functional boundaries and administrations, this also includes the 
potential for the redistribution of functions and resources within the communities in South 
Africa.  
Even though this process was presented as a technical exercise, in practice, it was also 
an intensely political one because it was concerned first and foremost with overcoming 
the legacies of apartheid government planning systems and racially-skewed resource 
distribution amongst the communities.22 
Thornhill writes that the newly elected democratic government of South Africa had to 
transform the local government system to meet the demands of a non-racial society which 
was totally fragmented due to the former government’s apartheid policy. This saw a new 
system being established to comply with constitutional guidelines. As a result, the whole 
system was redetermined and restructured and replaced with a new system which is 
continuously being reviewed and amended: today municipalities in South Africa have 
been established and demarcated in such a way that it covers not only the urban areas 
but the total geographical area of the Republic of South Africa.23 
According to Mahlangu, municipal boundaries could include amalgamating some 
municipalities and demarcating new areas depending on the inputs from municipalities, 
provinces and other stakeholders.24 
Pycroft writes that “the point of departure in overcoming the structural limitations of the 
transitional form of local government in South Africa is to re-conceptualize and where 
necessary, redraw municipal boundaries. He further highlights that the MDB has to 
                                                             
22 Beall J ‘Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South Africa’ 
(2004) 54 Development Destin Studies Institute 7. 
23 Thornill C ‘The transformed Local Government System: some lessons’ (2008) 43 Journal of Public Administration 
492. 
24 Mahlangu L ‘Municipal Demarcation Board Reviews: Municipal boundaries for the 2016 local elections’ (2011) 
13(4) Local Government Bulletin 15. 
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determine the optimum boundary of all municipalities in South Africa, guided by the 
criteria provided for in the White Paper on Local Government, 1998 and Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998)”.25 
Whittal and Nxumalo highlight that the Municipal Demarcation Board is authorised to 
demarcate municipal boundaries and dissolve the spatial layout of apartheid government 
and it is also mandated to create new municipal areas of jurisdiction which are nor racially-
based. The aim of municipal restructuring is to assist in redressing the imbalances of the 
past and the inequalities in public service. They write further that the new municipal areas 
should be structured to help in addressing the urban/rural divide and integrate economic 
and social development.26 
 
1.4.2. Accommodation of ethnicity` 
According to Chandra, ethnic identity refers to nominal membership in an ascriptive 
category that is inclusive of language, caste, race or religion. This is consistent with the 
broad definition now taken as standard in the field of ethnic mobilization: in that “ethnicity 
easily embraces groups that are differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers 
nationalities, races, tribes, and castes”.27 Gilley highlights that ethnicity is usually defined 
as that part of a person’s identity which is drawn from one or more markers such as 
religion, race, social symbols, region, shared history or language. It is distinct from that 
part of a person’s identity that comes from, say, economic status, personal moral doctrine, 
civic affiliations or personal history.28 
Horowitz highlights that ethnicity  
is a powerful affiliation, both because similarity is valued and because genetic (or 
putatively genetic) origins and early socialization are potent sources of similarity 
                                                             
25 Pycroft, C 'Democracy and delivery: the rationalization of local government in South Africa' (2000) 66 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 151. 
26 Whittal J & Nxumalo C ‘Municipal Boundary Demarcation in South Africa: Processes and Effects on Governance 
in Traditional Rural Areas’ (2013) 2 South African Journal of Geomatics 325. 
27 Chandra K ‘Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability’ (2005) 3 perspectives of politics 236. 
28 Gilley B ‘Against the concept of ethnic conflict’ (2004) 25 Third World Quarterly 1158. 
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or, in any case, of cues that signal similarity: customs, language, appearance, 
gestures, tastes, clothing, and habits. The assumption of similarity follows quickly 
once groups are formed, even in laboratories, and reinforces group identity. Even 
more powerful is the assumption of resemblance that evolve from birth or common 
experiences of childhood.29  
Horowitz writes that “in societies severely divided by ethnicity, religion, language, race or 
any other form of ascriptive affiliation, ethnic differences or divisions make democracy 
difficult, because they tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. An ethnic party 
with a majority of votes and seats can dominate minority groups, seemingly in perpetuity. 
Some vision of this problem informs the politics of a great many severely divided societies. 
In severely divided societies with ethnically-based parties, ordinary majority rule in most 
cases results in ethnic domination”.30 He writes further: 
Ethnic identities are dynamic both in their character and in their salience, even 
when an armed conflict has deepened divisions between groups and seen ethnicity 
rise to become an all-dominant social marker. Important opportunities for peace 
building may be lost if intervening actors fail to acknowledge the complexity nature 
of ethnicity and opt for policies that institutionalise ethnic differences.31   
Ethnic diversity has clear political, economic and social consequences.32 Easterly writes 
that  
ethnic differences and diversity has a more adverse effect on economic growth 
and the adoption of economic policy when institutions are poor. To put it another 
way, poor institutions have an even more adverse impact on growth and policy 
when ethnic diversity is high. Conversely, in countries with sufficiently good 
institutions, ethnic diversity does not lower growth or worsen economic policies. In 
other words, good institutions can also lower the risk of genocides and wars that 
                                                             
29 Horowitz D L ‘Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict’ (1998) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-1251813753820/6415739-1251813951236/horowitz.  
30 Horowitz D L ‘Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems’ Vol. 25 (2014) Journal of Democracy No.2 pp. 5.  
31 Simonsen S G ‘Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-CONFLICT institution-BUILDING: Lessons from Recent Cases’ 
(2005) 36 SAGE Journals 297. 
32 Gilley (2004) 1155. 
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might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalisation. Therefore, ethnically diverse 
nations that wish to endure in prosperity and peace must build good institutions.33  
South Africa is a home to different ethnic groups. According to Portes, ethnic awareness 
can be defined or interpreted to be the perception by members of a certain minority group 
of the social distance separating them from the dominant group and the existence of 
discrimination based on racial or cultural differences. Awareness of social distance and 
of negative stereotypes has been said to be a decisive factor affecting the behaviour of 
minority-group members. The opposite of ethnic awareness is then the belief and a sense 
of equality that one can freely mingle and associated with anyone else in the society; such 
perceptions are said to characterise fully "assimilated" minorities.34 
The accommodation of ethnic differences at the local government level is often viewed 
as a catalyst of ethnic tensions among communities and also contributing to national 
disintegration.35 However, Singiza and De Visser argue that neglecting the wishes of 
other ethnic or other cultural groups may lead to alienation and demoralization. This is 
because when a group has been politically alienated at the central government (national 
level), pursuing political claims at the local level then becomes a logical option.36  
Fessha points out that the South African Constitution depicts a state (country) that strive 
to build a common national identity and a state that emphasise national unity. However, 
even though it seeks to build national unity it does so at the expense of ethnic diversity 
because it rather acknowledge that subnational identities are an important part of the 
South African make-up.37  
Fessha writes further that  
                                                             
33 Easterly W ‘Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict’ (2001) 49 Economic Development and Cultural Change 703. 
34 Portes A ‘the Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions among Cuban Exiles in Miami’ (1984) 49 
American Sociological Review Journal 383. 
35 A Conference Report ‘The accommodation of ethnic differences at the local government level is often viewed as 
a catalyst of ethnic tensions among communities and also contributing to national disintegration.’ Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1995-10-01A.pdf (accessed 17 August 2017). 
36 Singiza D K & De Visser J ‘Chewing more than one can swallow: the creation of new districts in Uganda’ (2011) 15 
Law, Democracy & Development 5. 
37 Fessha Y ‘The politics of ethnicity and the post-apartheid constitutional dispensation’ (2014). 
http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/11/Fessha1 
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a multi-ethnic state that strive to suppress diversity and attempts to build a 
common national identity based on the core culture of a particular ethnic group is 
bound to provoke violent ethnic nationalist movements. Similarly, a state that 
ostensibly follows a policy of neutrality when it comes to ethnic relationships often 
end up identifying itself with a particular group, therefore a multi-ethnic state should 
seek to avoid an attempt to homogenize its ethnically diverse population and 
transform it into a nation-state or remain ‘culturally neutral’.38 
De Visser, Steytler and Fessha highlight that the use of ethnicity to organise internal 
boundaries is also evident to a certain extent, in the internal territorial organisation of the 
subnational units in Ethiopia. The territorial organisation of local government which is 
determined by the regional legislatures, has taken ethnic lines in some of the states, 
particularly in states that are home to more than one ethnic group.39 
Ethnicity is a fact to be taken into consideration, while on the other hand, ethnic identity 
is simply a fact into which everyone especially those born in Africa have the privilege to 
obtain membership without any recourse to application, papers and bureaucratic red-
tape.40 Furthermore, ethnicity may hold a strong key to democratizing the state and 
development in Africa if recognised rather than denying its existence. Pursuant to that 
unless ethnicity is taken seriously Africa’s struggle to democratize the state and 
development will suffer no better a fate than that of an imagined nation state. This position 
of condoning ethnicity as a crucial factor in state building in Africa is quite relevant to the 
case of Ethiopia, where ethnicity has already become an ‘official’ state practice and 
ideology.41  
 
 
                                                             
38 Fessha Y T ‘Ethnic Diversity and Federalism: Constitution Making in South Africa and Ethiopia’ (2010) 241. 
39 De Visser J, Steytler N & Fessha Y ‘The role of ethnicity in the demarcation of internal boundaries in South Africa 
and Ethopia’ (2012). 
40 Seyoum H Ethnicity in Africa towards a Positive Approach (1997) 11-17. 
41 Alemayehu A N Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of Lund, 2004) 16-17  
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1.4.3. Violent protests as a form of political participation 
Due to the sensitivities around ethnic concerns, great care must be taken to consult 
communities that are affected by the municipal demarcation process. There should be a 
mechanism to ensure that consultation is enforced at a local government level so that 
members of the public can participate fully. This is because two decades into democracy, 
South Africa observed a serious wave of protests associated with poor or lack of service 
delivery around the country. It is further highlighted that poor service delivery elicited 
protests across the country which brought local government or municipalities under the 
spotlight. Since then local municipalities has been a subject of criticism for failing to 
implement their development mandate.42   
In 2013, the MDB was under serious criticism after riots erupted in Zamdela. According 
to Mathekga, it may seem that this protests originated from service delivery issues, 
however, these protests can be understood separately from issues of service delivery as 
alleged.43 This means that issues like ethnic tensions and mobilisation as well as lack of 
consultation might also contribute to dissatisfaction by community members expressed 
as rioting and looting of properties.  
Mathoho attests that there are different kinds of protests that occur in the country time 
and again. However, those who are careless end up categorising these protests as 
service delivery protests while in reality they vary from one protest to another. They 
include service delivery, tribalism or ethnic, political and demarcation protests.44 That is 
why in most cases the majority of people always display their frustrations and impatience 
over poor, slow or lack of service delivery in the form of demonstrations, protests, 
boycotts, petitions and strikes which are characterized by looting, violence, bloodshed, 
vandalism and casualties.45  
                                                             
42 Mashamaite K (2014) 234. 
43 Matehkga R ‘The challenge of local government structures in South Africa: securing community participation’ 
(2006) Available at http://www.clearcontent.co.za/storage/files/prev_Challenge_of_local_govt_structures_in_SA. 
(Accessed 22 December 2016). 
44 Mathoho M (2016) 1. 
45 Mashamaite K (2014) 231. 
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There is a clear indication that community members in the Limpopo Province and South 
Africa in general, do not agree with the system used by the government in providing them 
with municipal services and the municipal demarcation process followed. In the past years 
most communities engaged in serious protests and burned government buildings. Rasils 
points out that the protesters did not see anything wrong in damaging government 
properties meant for their use and for the creation of a better life. Community members 
also do not mind disrupting the education of their own children.46 Managa states that lack 
of public participation and accountability by the officials are the main factors aggravating 
service delivery protest in South Africa.47 
 
1.4.4. The use of ethnicity as a factor in determining municipal boundaries 
Though many scholars have written on the determination and realignment of boundaries 
in South Africa focusing more on the provinces and on the demarcation of municipalities, 
there is no written work on the use of ethnicity as a factor in the demarcation process. 
This study adds to the current issues that the MDB is faced with in establishing and 
merging the municipalities in South Africa. This study therefore contributes to 
understanding a new development in using ethnicity in determining municipal boundaries 
in South Africa. Ethnicity is a response to the problems and tensions that the Municipal 
Demarcation Board is faced with. The significant contribution of this study in the field of 
local government is to provide an insight on the use of ethnicity as a factor in the 
demarcation process. 
The study contends that in as much as the Constitution recognises that South Africa is a 
unitary and non-racial country, ethnic diversity cannot be ignored in determining municipal 
boundaries as it is currently the burning issue in Limpopo. This study will also contribute 
                                                             
46 Rasila B N ‘South African Government and its communities at war: The legacy of the struggle for democracy’ 
(2015) 3 Journal of Education, Psychology and Social Sciences 67. 
47 Managa A ‘Unfulfilled promises and their consequences: A Reflection on Local Government Performance and the 
Critical issue of Poor Service Delivery in South Africa’ Africa Institute of South Africa: Policy Brief No.76. Pretoria: 
AISA (2012). 
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to a new literature and help new researchers who want to continue their research in this 
field.  
 
5. Chapter outline 
This research paper consists of five chapters. Chapter One deal introduction which lays 
down the main foundation of the study. Chapter Two discusses the historical background 
to the case of Malamulele and Vuwani. Chapter Three focuses on the municipal 
demarcation process in South Africa. Chapter Four discusses the use of ethnicity in 
demarcating internal boundaries in Ethiopia. Finally, Chapter Five deals with the 
conclusion and recommendations of the whole study. 
 
6. Methodology 
The research methodology used in this research paper is library based and relies on 
newspapers, popular media reports, text books, reports, legislations, regulations and 
articles. Information was also obtained from internet sources, government manuals and 
policy documents. This study will focus on municipal demarcation tensions and protests 
observed in Malamulele and Vuwani communities which are situated in Limpopo 
province.  Furthermore, this study will also make a comparative study to Ethiopia. Ethiopia 
is a diversified nation with more than 80 ethnic groups and this makes it a good example 
and reference of this study. The main reason for choosing Ethiopia in this study is 
because it is the only African country that uses ethnicity explicitly for demarcation both in 
the regional level as well as at the local government level.   
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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CHAPTER TWO 
MUNICIPAL DEMARCATION TENSIONS: THE CASE OF VUWANI AND 
MALAMULELE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the historical background to the case of 
the Malamulele and Vuwani communities.  Both these communities are situated in the 
Limpopo province in South Africa. The Malamulele community uses the Xitsonga-
language as their medium of communication while on the other hand Vuwani uses 
Tshivenda as their language. The community of Malamulele formed part of the Thulamela 
Local Municipality in the Vhembe District and was part of ward 13 with a population of 17 
666.48  
However, the Malamulele community alleged that they did not receive municipal services 
from the Thulamela Local Municipality. As a result the community demanded its own 
municipality separate from Thulamela Local Municipality; their demand resulted in 
protests and looting of shops.49 
Initially the community’s request for its own municipality was rejected by the MDB. Later 
the decision was taken by the Municipal Demarcation Board at the request of the Minister 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs to provide the community with its own 
municipality. The provision of a new municipality to the community of Malamulele meant 
that some parts of the Makhado Local Municipality will form part of the new Malamulele 
Municipality. As a result, the community of Vuwani was incorporated in the new 
                                                             
48 Malamulele Demographics available at 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/ee65040048fb4c658f9a8fcd12612d62/Malamuleleundefinedtoundefinedbeundefi
nedaundefinedmunicipality-20150407 (accessed 04 December 2016). 
49 Mokgopo T I ‘The burning South Africa in the 20 years of democracy: Service delivery protests and demarcation 
protests with specific reference to the case of Malamulele and Vuwani’ 2016 SAAPAM 65.   
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municipality. The community of Vuwani was not happy with the decision to include them 
in the new Malamulele municipality.50 
 
2.2. Malamulele and Vuwani municipal demarcation  
2.2.1. Malamulele 
Malamulele residents wanted to be separated from the Thulamela Local Municipality. The 
latter is based on the edge of the Kruger National Park, which is about 50 km from 
Mamulelele community. Community members were eager to obtain their own municipality 
because they claimed that the municipality prioritises municipal services to Tshivenda-
speaking sections only, a claim which the municipality denied.51 
On 21 December 2009, the Municipal Demarcation Board received a request from 
Malamulele Community Development forum for re-determination of the boundary of the 
Thulamela Local Municipality. The request was that the MDB should exclude the 
Malamulele area and determine the Malamulele area as a separate category B 
Municipality in the Vhembe District municipality. As a result the request by the Malamulele 
community was listed as one of the cases that were before the Municipal Demarcation 
Board and due for consideration as part of the then concluded municipal boundary 
redetermination process.52 However, the MDB resolved on 16 August 2012 to reject the 
proposal and close the matter due to a lack of support from the MEC responsible for local 
government in Limpopo Province and the Vhembe District Municipality.  
A meeting was held on 26 October 2012 and all key stakeholders in this matter were 
notified accordingly on the decision of the Municipal Demarcation Board. On 21 
                                                             
50 Maringa M & Tiva W ‘Limpopo Vhembe District Municipality inaugurated’ SABC News 17 August 2016 Available 
at http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/6fe76b804de64f91a956edebaa746de2/Limpopo-Vhembe-District-Municipality-
inaugurated-20161708  (accessed 20 November 2016).  
51 Tiva W ‘Limpopo MEC pleads for an end to Malamulele violence’ SABC News 2 February 2015 
Available at http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/dcdf13804728bc548f9aaf686e648436/Limpopo-MEC-pleads-for-an-
end-to-Malamulele-violence-20150202 (accessed on 17 September 2016).  
52 Municipal Demarcation Board ‘Feasibility Study: Re-determination of the boundary of the Thulamela Local 
municipality by excluding Malamulele area and determining this area as a separate Category B municipality within 
the Vhembe District municipality’ (2015) 9. 
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September 2013, the residents of Malamulele went on a rampage after the demarcation 
meeting and torched municipal property.53 
Currently, the Thulamela Local Municipality head office is situated in Thohoyandou which 
has predominantly to Venda-speaking people. While on the other hand the Malamulele 
community is a Xitsonga-speaking community and it formed part of Thulamela Local 
Municipality. The Malamulele community alleged that they were not provided with 
municipal services and that members of their community were not employed by the 
municipality because the municipality hires Venda-speaking people only. As a result, the 
community members demonstrated against the municipality to force the municipality to 
provide them with the services they deserved. Even during this protest their demands 
were not met by the municipality.  
In 2014, residents lost faith in the Thulamela Local Municipality and service delivery 
protests changed to demarcation protests. The Municipal Demarcation Board was taken 
to task as the community demanded its own municipality away from Thulamela which is 
a Venda dominated municipality. Residents accused the municipality of only delivering 
services to the Thohoyandou area. They pointed out that they felt sidelined by the 
municipality. This is because the municipality has its offices in Thohoyandou, nearly an 
hour’s drive away from the Malamulele community.  
After years of waiting, talking and hoping for things to change, the people of Malamulele 
burnt buildings. The schools in the area were also forced to shut down due to violence.54 
At least 100 schools were reportedly affected by the protest when protesters barred and 
prohibited pupils from attending school. The Malamulele area came to a standstill when 
protesters forced shops in the local mall to close two days before inland schools were 
due to open for the new academic year. Schools and businesses in the area remained 
closed.55 
                                                             
53 Mokgopo T I (2016) 66. 
54 eNCA ‘Malamulele protests cause concern’ eNCA 18 October 2013 available at https://www.enca.com/south-
africa/malamulele-protests-cause-concern (accessed 06 December 2016). 
55 ‘Malamulele protesters 'trading education for short-term demands’ available at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-
22-police-monitoring-malamulele-ahead-of-friday-deadline-for-government-to-respond (accessed 06 December 
2016).  
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The Malamulele community’s violent protest involved about 15 000 community members. 
They damaged and looted shops. Four of their shopping complexes were looted and 
damaged completely; they also damaged 37 houses, a truck, burnt a grader and lit six 
cars. The police had to use force and managed to stop community members from burning 
the local hospital.56 These saw close to 60 people being arrested and charged with public 
violence.    
Due to the community’s demand for its own municipality, the arrests did not stop them 
from protesting. Community members again went on a rampage and destroyed 
government buildings and barricaded the roads.  
The premier of Limpopo, Stan Mathabatha, blamed the violent protests that erupted in 
the Thulamela Local Municipality on tribalism. The main reason for this is because 
Thulamela Local Municipality is currently divided into two predominant groups, mainly 
Venda- and Tsonga-speaking and the differences in language were also known to arise 
within the municipal council.57 This therefore raised ethnic tensions between the two 
communities, as members from each ethnic group prefers to use their own language even 
in the municipal council meeting without considering other community members from 
different ethnic group, either being Venda- or Tsonga-speakers. However, Shivambu 
highlights that:  
“The violent protests that have defined Malamulele to demand a Municipality 
independent of the Thulamela Local Municipality have largely been defined and 
characterised in media circles as tribal cries for a tribal authority. While the 
consciousness of ordinary people in Malamulele might have tribal undertones, it is 
entirely incorrect that a demand for a municipality is solely on the basis of tribal 
dynamics, wherein Xitsonga speaking citizens do not want to be under a 
Municipality that is predominated by Tshivenda speaking citizens. It is only lazy 
                                                             
56 News 24 ‘South African Protest News’ News 24 21 August - 9 September 2013’ available at http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za 
(accessed 16 December 2016). 
57 Sapa ‘Tribalism behind Malamulele protest-Premier’ IOL News 18 September 2013 Available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/tribalism-behind-malamulele-protest-premier (accessed 06 December 
2016). ` 
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minds that reduce the genuine demands into a tribal issue because there are real 
socio economic aspects and features that need attention in Malamulele”.58 
The above statement by Shivambu is too political and therefore not true when compared 
to the real issues raised by the Malamulele community. The community alleged that they 
were not provided with municipal services and that the Thulamela Local Municipality has 
been channelling services to Tshivenda-speaking areas, rather than their Xitsonga-
speaking area.59 This is therefore an ethnic issue between the Tshivenda-speaking 
people and the Xitsonga-speaking community. These ethnic tensions led to the 
Malamulele community demanding their own separate municipality away from the 
Tshivenda-speaking community. 
These demands have fueled tensions between Tshivenda- and Xitsonga-speakers and 
triggered division among local traditional leaders as some regard it as a tribal issue as 
stated by the premier of Limpopo. However, the protesters placed the blame on the 
Municipal Demarcation Board for not considering their call.  
After the decision was taken not to give the community its own municipality all the 
stakeholders including the Malamulele Demarcation Task Team (MDTT) provided the 
Municipal Demarcation Board with additional information regarding their proposal.  The 
new information was sent to the Municipal Demarcation Board and it included inputs from 
the Vhembe District and the MEC for local government. Additional information that was 
sent to the Board by the MDTT and different community representatives with regard to 
the proposed boundary re-determination raised a number of issues as motivation for this 
proposal. Some of the issues raised by the community of Malamulele include:  
a) Lack of consultation by the MDB during the demarcation process in 1999/2000;  
b) Poor or lack of service delivery by the Thulamela Local Municipality;   
c) Discrimination against the Greater Malamulele area;  
                                                             
58 Shivambu F ‘The case for Malamulele Municipality: A cogent case for Malamulele Municipality, it is not tribalism, 
it is service delivery’ available at http://floydn.blogspot.co.za/2015/01/the-case-for-malamulele-municipality 
(accessed 06 December 2016).  
59 Online Library ‘Malamulele School in Limpopo set alight, despite lockdown’ SAPA 3 Feb 2015 Available at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/default.asp? (Accessed on 3 October 2016).  
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d) The population size of the Greater Malamulele area as compared to some 
municipalities in the Limpopo Province e.g. Mutale Municipality, Bela-Bela 
Municipality, etc.; and  
e)  Various government departments have satellite offices in Malamulele whereas 
this is not the case in many of the existing smaller municipalities. 
 
The Municipal Demarcation Board discussed the new information at a meeting that was 
held on 17 May 2014.60  The Board resolved to conduct a feasibility study to investigate 
the proposed boundary re-determination. The meeting further resolved that if the result 
of the investigation is in favour of the re-determination of the municipal boundary as 
requested, it should be considered after the 2016 local government elections. The MDB 
highlighted that if it is not feasible, it (the MDB) shall close the case and not proceed with 
the process as outlined in the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act 
No. 27 of 1998).61 
However, in 2015 the then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 
Pravin Gordhan, requested the MDB in early 2015 to consider Malamulele community’s 
demand for its own municipality separate from Thulamela Local Municipality. The MDB 
considered the request and created a new municipality in Malamulele. Community 
members were very happy with the decision to provide them with their own municipality. 
Community members then proposed that the new Malamulele municipality be named 
after the then Minister of Public Service and Administration, Collins Chabane.  As a result, 
a new municipality was demarcated by the Municipal Demarcation Board which included 
some parts of Makhado. Among the communities that benefited from this action or 
decision was the community of Malamulele that had previously placed pressure on 
government with their protests action demanding an independent municipality away from 
                                                             
60 Municipal Demarcation Board (2015) 9.  
61 Municipal Demarcation Board ‘The Proposed Redetermination of Thulamela Local Municipality to Create a 
Separate Municipality for the Area of Malamulele’ (2014) 21.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
22 
 
Thulamela Local Municipality. A new municipality was formed on the eastern side of 
Vhembe District, giving residents the independence for which they had fought for.62  
 
2.2.2. Vuwani 
The Municipal Demarcation Board made a redetermination and as a result, a new 
municipality which included Malamulele and a part of Makhado known as Vuwani was 
formed. This decision led to a serious protest which saw the community of Vuwani burning 
29 schools in the community and nearby community. The community of Vuwani alleged 
that they were not consulted by the MDB about the decision to incorporate the area into 
the new Malamulele Municipality. The community also highlighted that they were not 
comfortable about being placed under the Makhado Municipality and that they will not be 
provided with municipal services in the new Malamulele municipality as it is a Xitsonga-
dominating municipality while Vuwani is a Venda-speaking community.  
Almost 52 000 pupils had been without schooling for a period of three months during the 
anti-demarcation protest action and as a result of the burning down of schools. The 
protests began in April 2016. As a result of an on-going protest in Vuwani many people’s 
lives were affected, mostly the learners as the schools in the area were burnt down. All 
children and teachers were also prohibited from going to school even after mobile classes 
were provided by the Department of Education.63  
Members of the community vowed to shut down the voting stations in the area as 
municipal elections were scheduled to take place on 3 August 2016. However, before that 
time there was a meeting held between the traditional leaders and the inter-ministerial 
task team led by Cooperative Governance Minister, Des van Rooyen. Both parties signed 
a “peace agreement” on the 28 July 2016; they also agreed that services would be 
restored to the community. The agreement was that voting would be allowed to proceed 
in the affected areas that were hindered by intimidation and violence.  
                                                             
62 ‘New structural divisions grant Malamulele its own municipality’ available at 
http://www.702.co.za/articles/3625/new-structural-divisions-enable-malamulele-with-its-own-municipality 
(accessed 06 December 2016).  
63 Mokgopo T I (2016) 68. 
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Community members in Vuwani responded to the said “peace agreement” and held that 
they would not hold back their boycotting of local government elections in the area despite 
an agreement that was signed between eight traditional leaders and the inter-ministerial 
task team. In terms of the agreement, the traditional leaders were given responsibilities 
to reassure communities in the Vuwani area that engagement with the government would 
resolve their grievances, but within hours of the signing ceremony in the Limpopo 
province at the Premier Stan Mathabatha’s office in Polokwane, community leaders 
vowed to continue their boycott of the polls on 3 August 2016. They claimed they were 
not consulted by the Venda King, Toni Mphephu Ramabulana or any of their chiefs who 
signed the peace agreement.  The anti-demarcation Pro-Makhado Task Team said the 
community believed their traditional leaders had betrayed them by signing a deal the 
community had not endorsed.”64 
The peace agreement was signed on 28 July 2016 and after the signing of the agreement, 
a meeting was held on 29 July 2016 between the Minister of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs, the inter-ministerial task team and the traditional leaders.65 
However, members of the Pro-Makhado Task Team walked out of the meeting stating 
that the protest would continue until the government agreed to reverse the decision to 
amalgamate the community of Vuwani and Malamulele and other surrounding village’s to 
form a new Malamulele municipality.  
Irrespective of that a new municipality was established and has 27 wards, of which 14 of 
these wards fall into the conflict-ridden Vuwani area.66 Community members threatened 
the total shutdown of services in Vuwani; which included that the boycotting of schools 
would not come to an end unless the decision of the Municipal Demarcation Board was 
reversed. Despite the community members protesting, a technical team continued to work 
                                                             
64 SA Local Government Information Centre ‘Vuwani residents vow to block elections despite traditional leaders 
signing agreements to allow voting’ (2016) No.11 The SA Local Government Briefing 27.  
65 eNCA ‘Vuwani shutdown set to continue despite peace ‘agreement’ eNCA  20 February 2017 Available at 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/vuwani-shutdown-set-to-continue-despite-peace-
%E2%80%98agreement%E2%80%99  (accessed 10 December 2016). 
66 The SA local government briefing no.11 (2016) 28. 
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with the provincial government department and the Vhembe District Municipality to ensure 
that a new municipality was established untroubled.  
This meant victory for the community of Malamulele, because on 4 July 2015 hundreds 
of residents of Malamulele attended a public meeting that was called to discuss the name 
of the new municipality.67 On 21 April 2016, Vuwani residents with the members of Pro-
Makhado Task Team as well as traditional leaders approached the court to set side aside 
the decision of the Municipal Demarcation Board. The applicants submitted that the 
Municipal Demarcation Board’s decisions were invalid because the MDB: 
a) Followed an unfair procedure in that the map for the Makhado Local Municipality, 
attached to the Board’s decision dated 2 July 2015, demonstrates that the Mashau 
and the Masakona traditional areas would remain within the municipal area 
of Makhado. 
b) The Municipal Demarcation Board separated traditional villages and traditional 
communities. 
c) The Municipal Demarcation Board ignored relevant considerations in coming to its 
decision, and 
d) The Municipal Demarcation made a decision that was not rationally connected to 
the factors that it had to consider in terms of the Local Government: Municipal 
Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998). 
 
On 29 April 2016 the Court dismissed the application by the applicant. The court held 
that: 
“There was an initial notification in terms of Section 26 of the Demarcation Act, and 
a public meeting in terms of Section 28. The Board met each of these 
requirements. Therefore, the complaint by the applicants that there was non-
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compliance with Section 26(2) and (3) and Section 28 has no basis and is thus 
rejected”.68 
Traditional leaders appealed against the decision of the High Court. However, the 
Constitutional Court announced on 7 July 2016 that it had dismissed the application by a 
group of traditional leaders for leave to appeal against the judgement of the Limpopo High 
Court. 
 
3. Conclusion  
Ethnic concern proved to be vocal in the Vuwani and Malamulele saga, as both 
communities raised their concern on their amalgamation by the Municipal Demarcation 
Board i.e. Malamulele community formed part of the Thulamela Local Municipality, 
whereas the community wanted its own municipality away from Venda-speakers and 
Vuwani community has been incorporated in the new Malamulele municipality while the 
community wanted to remain being part of Makhado Local Municipality. The refusal by 
both communities to form part of a municipality that is dominated by a different ethnic 
group clearly proves that ethnic differences are rising in an alarming rate at the local 
government level in South Africa. However, the factors provided for in the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) does not consider 
the use of ethnicity in demarcating municipalities in South Africa. Pursuant to that the 
decision was taken to provide the community of Malamulele with its own municipality and 
the two communities were incorporated to form part of a new Malalmulele municipality.    
Though the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) does 
not provide for the use of ethnicity in determining municipal services, the decision that 
was taken to amalgamate these two communities proved to be a time-ticking ethnic bomb 
because this decision led to riots and protests that saw schools being burned. It will be 
proper to conclude that ethnic differences between these two communities led to 
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municipal demarcation tensions and what is known in this study as the Malamulele and 
Vuwani saga.  
From the above, it is therefore important to examine the steps and process that the MDB 
considers when demarcating municipalities in South Africa. This is because the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) provides for the 
processes that must be followed. If the Municipal Demarcation Board decides to 
determine municipal boundaries in South Africa, the Board must consider the factors that 
are contained in the Act. The following chapter highlights the process of demarcating 
municipal boundaries in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MUNICIPAL DEMARCATION PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the process of demarcation in South Africa, the 
criteria used by the Municipal Demarcation Board and the process followed by the MDB 
when there are objections as well as to what happens when the MDB rejects objections 
and the remedies that are available.  
 
3.2. Demarcating provincial boundaries 
For one to be able to understand the process of municipal demarcation in South Africa it 
will be best to first look at the demarcation process that was carried out when demarcating 
provincial boundaries in South Africa as it had to deal with the issue of ethnicity as a 
factor. This process was carried out by the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation 
of States, Provinces and Regions (CDDR).  
The CDDR had to determine boundaries in lieu of the elections which were expected to 
take place on 27 April 1994.69 However, the main question then was about the criteria to 
be used during this demarcation process. This was because the new and democratic 
South Africa was not expected to reflect the apartheid use of ethnic-based homelands. 
As a result, ethnicity was not listed as a criterion for demarcating boundaries. The criteria 
used by the CDDR in demarcating provincial boundaries includes amongst others: taking 
into account the availability of infrastructure and historical boundaries as well as existing 
government structures; demographics; service delivery; economic viability; potential for 
development; “cultural and language realities”; inconvenience to citizens and dislocations 
of service.70 Consideration was given to economic and development potential, socio-
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cultural issues, and administrative and institutional capacity as well as erasing the 
boundaries of apartheid political entities to establish a unified territorial space for all South 
Africans. Other factors includes de-racialising the country so that people may start to think 
of themselves as South Africans holding diverse views and not as members of any racial, 
ethnic or linguistic group.71 The interpretation of the above criteria remained in the hands 
of the commissioners and they organised the criteria into four categories: economic 
aspects; institutional and administrative capacity; geographic coherence; socio-cultural 
issues and an agreement to evaluate each proposed boundary on its merits within each 
of the above four categories.72  The boundaries of the nine provinces so drawn did not 
create exclusive ethnic enclaves but in seven of the provinces there were linguistic 
majorities. 
 
3.3. Demarcating local boundaries 
3.3.1. Initial demarcation: pre-1995 
It was during the negotiations stage that South Africa’s constitutional makers decided in 
1992/93 to divide the local government democratisation process into three phases.73 The 
pre-interim phase: 1993-1995, the interim phase: 1995-1999 and the final phase after that 
known as the Democratic Local Government phase.74 The Local Government Transition 
Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993) provided for the establishment of a Local Government 
Demarcation Board in each of the nine provinces in South Africa;75 with a pre-interim local 
government stage to demarcate boundaries for the first local government elections in 
South Africa in 1995.76 The major political objective of these Provincial Boards was to 
eliminate apartheid boundaries into unified municipalities. This is because during the 
                                                             
71 Ramutsindela M (2007) 49.  
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73 Cameron R ‘Central-Local Financial Relations in South Africa’ 2002, available at 
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apartheid era, the sphere of local government in South Africa became the mechanism 
through which racial and cultural groups were divided and kept separate.  
In performing its duties, the Provincial Boards managed to break down apartheid 
boundaries.77 This was however not always the case in smaller towns and rural areas.78 
The main aim was to deracialise local government which led to a reduction of 
municipalities;79 reducing them from more than 1000 prior to 1994 to 843 municipalities.80  
According to Cameron, the problems of the demarcation in the 1995 elections was 
unevenness because communities remained fragmented i.e. some communities were 
split by provincial boundaries.81   
 
3.3.2. Demarcation post-1995 
Chapter 7 of the 1996 Constitution gives effect to the establishment of a local government 
sphere. Section 151 of the Constitution provides that the local sphere of government 
consists of municipalities which must be established for the whole territory of the 
Republic.82  
It is best to highlight that the major change brought by the Constitution of 1996 was that 
local government had to cover the whole of South Africa. The Constitution provides for 
the demarcation of municipalities in South Africa by an independent body known as the 
Municipal Demarcation Board.83  
In 1998, the Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) was adopted and the 
Municipal Demarcation Board was established and began to determine the locations of 
local government boundaries in 1999. During this demarcation process traditional rural 
areas and rural communities were severely affected by the process of demarcating 
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municipal boundaries.84 This saw rural communities being integrated to form part of a 
single municipality or being split apart between two municipalities.   
As a result, the first redrawn municipal boundaries resulted in numerous disputes by 
community members against both the processes followed and boundary outcomes. In 
many cases rural communities were split between two municipalities, while others were 
split over two district municipalities and even two provinces.85  
The Demarcation Board managed to reduce the number of municipalities from 843 to 
284.86 This saw communities that were poorly developed being combined with well-
resourced communities under the same municipal boundaries.87 The main aim of 
municipal demarcations and restructuring of municipalities is to assist in redressing the 
imbalances created by the past apartheid government and those that were created by the 
provincial boards.88 As such, new municipal areas after demarcation are expected to help 
address the urban and rural division and integrate social and economic development. 
However, some of the redrawn municipal boundaries have resulted in numerous disputes 
ever since 2000.  
After the demarcation process some traditional areas were split between two 
municipalities and in those cases traditional authorities who are recognised as the 
custodians of rural land have been greatly affected. Those who are mostly affected by the 
municipal demarcation process are those residing and heading small rural areas of two 
to three communities. However, traditional leaders who happen to be the leaders of these 
communities continue to have major control over most of the important rural survival 
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strategies such as the allocation of land, natural resources, communal labour practices 
and in some instances law and order.89  
 
3.4. Role players in the Demarcation Process 
The Municipal Demarcation Board is an independent body that is responsible for the 
demarcation of municipal boundaries in South Africa. The members of the MDB represent 
various professional fields of expertise that is appropriate to the field of local 
government.90 Even though there are other actors in the demarcation process the main 
actor is the independent MDB whose members are appointed by the president of the 
Republic of South Africa after a stringent and rigorous selection process. In addition to 
the MDB there are also a number of role players involved in the demarcation process. 
These are members of communities, traditional leaders, municipalities, political parties, 
NGOs and civil society.  
Municipalities in their own capacity play an important role in subsequent re-demarcations. 
Municipalities are mainly tasked to provide the MDB with the necessary administration 
and facilities to enable it to fulfil its constitutional obligations. Municipalities should also 
take part in the demarcation process since the demarcation process affects their 
functionality. Pursuant to that, most municipalities are also in the best position to provide 
required information and guidance from the local communities as to where best 
boundaries should be demarcated for effectiveness. Furthermore, submissions and 
extensive inputs should be made by all municipalities to ensure not only participation but 
also a proper consideration before boundaries are drawn.91  
Last but not least are the communities and local residents. The main reason for their 
inclusion in the demarcation process is that they are the ones who are most likely to be 
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affected on the ground. To ensure that their voices are heard specific provision is made 
in the demarcation process for individuals and groups to submit written representations 
on municipal boundaries to the Demarcation Board.92 They can also air their views at the 
public meetings and submit formal objections on the demarcation boundaries. The MDB 
in turn must consider and respond to all objections.93  
 
3.5.  The objectives of the MDB and demarcation criteria 
When the Board determines a municipal boundary its main objective must be to establish 
an area that would enable the municipality of that area to fulfil its constitutional obligations, 
which includes among others: the provision of democratic and accountable government 
for the local communities; the provision of services to the communities in an equitable 
and sustainable manner; the promotion of social and economic development and the 
promotion of a safe and healthy environment.94 It must also enable effective local 
governance; integrated development and have a tax base as inclusive as possible of 
users of municipal services in the municipality.95  
 
3.6. Factors to be taken into consideration  
Section 25 of the Municipal Demarcation Act provides the factors to be taken into 
consideration in meeting the objectives that are set out in the act. In terms of section 25, 
for the MB to attain these objectives, it must take into consideration:  
amongst others, communities, the interdependence of people, and economies as 
indicated by existing and expected patterns of human settlement and migration; 
employment; commuting and dominant transport movements; spending; the use 
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of amenities, recreational facilities and infrastructure; and commercial and 
industrial linkages.96 
These include also the need for cohesive, integrated and unfragmented areas, including 
metropolitan areas; the financial viability and administrative capacity of the municipality 
to perform municipal functions efficiently and effectively; the need to share and 
redistribute financial and administrative resources; provincial and municipal boundaries; 
areas of traditional rural communities; magisterial districts, voting districts, including 
existing and proposed functional boundaries, transport, health, police and census 
enumerator boundaries; social, economic and transport planning as well as existing and 
expected land use,97  
Furthermore there is a need for co-ordinated national, provincial and municipal 
programmes and services, including the needs of the administration of justice and health 
care; environmental and physical characteristics of the area; topographical, the 
administrative consequences of its boundary determination on municipal 
creditworthiness; existing municipalities, their council members and staff; and any other 
relevant matter; and the need to rationalise the total number of municipalities within 
different categories and of different types to achieve the objectives of effective and 
sustainable service delivery, macro-economic stability and financial viability.98  
 
3.7. Municipal Demarcation process 
3.7.1. Public notification of determination of municipal boundaries 
Before the MB can consider any determination of a municipal boundary it must follow a 
public notice procedure provided for in in terms of section 26 of the Municipal Demarcation 
Act. The notice should state the MDB’s intention to consider the determination of 
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municipal boundaries and invite written views and representations from the public. The 
time frame for such representation should not be shorter than 21 days.99   
Other methods of publication of such notice by the MDB may include communication or 
other appropriate means of communication within the area concerned. 100 This includes 
each municipality that will be affected by the Board's consideration of the matter as well 
as any magisterial district if affected and the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders 
concerned. The traditional leaders will be those established by provincial legislation in 
terms of section 212 (2) (a) of the Constitution only if the boundary of such a traditional 
authority is affected. If affected by such municipal boundary determination then the 
affected traditional leaders may also be invited to submit their views as well as their written 
representations on the matter to the Board within the period determined in terms of 
section 26 of the Act.101 
 
3.7.2. Community/Public Participation and consideration by the MDB 
The Municipal Demarcation Act provides that when the period for views and written 
representations has expired, the MDB must consider all views and written representations 
submitted to it and may take a decision on the determination or, before it takes such a 
decision hold a public meeting and conduct a formal investigation; or do both.102 
Thornhill highlights that community participation may take place through political 
structures, through other mechanisms such as an imbizo (informal gatherings where 
questions can be asked on any issues relating to the demarcation process), consultative 
sessions, public meetings and report back sessions with local communities.103 If the MDB 
decides to hold a public meeting, it must publish a notice in the newspaper circulating in 
the area concerned stating the time, date and place of the meeting or of each meeting; 
and inviting the public to attend the meeting or meetings.104 When the MDB publishes a 
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notice, it must convey where appropriate, by radio or other appropriate means of 
communication the contents of the notice in the area concerned.105 At a public meeting a 
representative of the MDB must explain the issues it has to consider including: any 
options open to it; allow members of the public attending the meeting to air their views on 
these issues and answer relevant questions.106 
 
3.7.3. Formal investigation and the power to investigate by the committee 
After receiving comments, the MDB should decide whether to embark on a formal 
investigation or not. Should it decide to conduct an investigation, the MDB may conduct 
such investigation itself or designate any of its members. Such member/s or committee 
must report back and make recommendations to the MDB.107 Pursuant to that for the 
purposes of its investigation the MDB or an investigating committee may by written notice 
summon a person who in its opinion has information which is material to the investigation 
to appear before the MB or the committee to give evidence. The expectation of the MDB 
in calling such person is for that person to produce a document available to that person 
as specified in the summons.108 The MDB may also call a person to make presentation 
at its meeting or committee meeting, whether summoned or not to give evidence before 
the MDB or committee; or to produce a document in that person's custody.109  
 
3.7.4. Objections against the MDB’s decision and consideration of the 
objections by the MDB 
Section 21 imposes an obligation on the MDB to publish its intentions to determine and 
re-determine municipal boundaries in the Provincial Gazette.110 This is to allow for the 
parties aggrieved by the MDB’s decision to submit written objections within 30 days of 
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that determination to the Board.111 It happens sometimes that members of the public may 
be aggrieved by the decision of the MDB to determine and re-determine municipal 
boundaries within their areas and objects to such a decision of re-determining municipal 
boundaries. The MDB must then consider any objections made by the parties, by either 
withdrawing, varying or confirming its determination and again publish its decision in the 
relevant Provincial Gazette.112 As already stated above, the MDB must consider such 
objections and after it has considered such objections, or has decided to re-determine a 
boundary under the circumstances provided for, and then the MDB must without any 
delay send such particulars of the determination of municipal boundaries to the Electoral 
Commission.113 
 
3.8. Critical analysis of whether ethnicity could be considered as a factor in 
terms of section 25 
One of the issues which contributed to the Malamulele and Vuwani protests is ethnic 
differences between the Venda- and Xitsonga-speakers.114 This therefore raised 
questions as to whether the use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal boundaries in South 
Africa could be considered as a factor? After considering the factors listed in terms of 
section 25 of the Municipal Demarcation Act, it will be best to analyse whether these 
factors include the consideration of ethnicity in determining municipal boundaries in South 
Africa either directly or indirectly. Only one factor provides for the use of ethnicity indirectly 
in demarcating municipal boundaries in South Africa. Section 25(f) provides explicitly that 
the Board must, when determining a municipal boundary, take into account areas of 
traditional rural communities and allow for public participation to ensure that traditional 
communities also participate in the municipal demarcation process.   
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Most traditional communities are home to certain ethnic groups and are being led by 
different traditional leaders. This therefore open a room for the issue of language to be 
considered as another factor which differentiate the areas of traditional communities. 
Besides other factors such as culture and religion, language plays a major role in as far 
as ethnical differences is concerned. It is the language that is spoken by people in these 
traditional areas which makes them ethnically different from each other. Section 25(f) 
covered the use of ethnicity in demarcating boundaries and by considering traditional 
communities as a factor, linguistic differences will automatically become a factor in 
demarcating a municipality. This is because one cannot speak of traditional areas without 
including the language spoken in that area.115  
Section 25(f) therefore provides for the indirect use of ethnicity as a factor in determining 
municipal boundaries in South Africa. One of the reasons why ethnicity was not provided 
for directly in this section was due to apartheid experiences. The explicit use of ethnicity 
in demarcating municipal boundaries was perceived as a return to the apartheid era. This 
therefore led to the silent use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal boundaries in South 
Africa.  
Although it was not acknowledged in writing after the decision was taken to give the 
community of Malamulele its own municipality away from the Thulamela Local 
Municipality, one does not need a microscopic eye to see that ethnicity was used as a 
factor in giving the community of Malamulele its own municipality in as far as this study is 
concerned.  This is because the Malamulele community raised ethnic issues against 
Thulamela Local Municipality, which is a Venda-speaking dominated municipality while 
the community of Malamulele is a Xitsonga-speaking community.116 
The case of Malamulele and Vuwani explicitly shows that ethnicity is or was considered 
as a factor when providing the Malamulele community with a separate municipality away 
from the Thulamela Local Municipality. This is the decision that led to ethnic tensions and 
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riots between the two communities when the community members from Vuwani fought 
against their incorporation in the new Malamulele Municipality.  It is therefore worth noting 
that the silence of the Constitution and the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation, 
1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) on the use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal boundaries in 
South Africa does not necessarily exclude ethnic tension between communities when 
municipal boundaries are being demarcated in South Africa.   
 
3.9. The demarcation process: traditional leaders’ response 
Traditional leaders are the custodians of many rural communities in South Africa where 
they are supposed to make sure that the rights of community members are protected. In 
the case of Malamulele and Vuwani, these two communities are under different traditional 
leaders, depending on their language, culture and tradition. This means that one cannot 
talk about ethnicity without mentioning traditional leaders. It is very clear that if the 
Municipal Demarcation Board must consider traditional areas, then it must also indirectly 
consider ethnic boundaries in certain cases. This is due to the fact that traditional leaders 
as well as traditional rural communities are not excluded from the demarcation process. 
Section 25 of the Municipal Demarcation provides that the MDB when determining a 
municipal boundary must take into account the areas of traditional rural communities.117  
Since the demarcation of municipalities in South Africa includes the demarcation of rural 
areas it would be proper to include the response of traditional leaders to the demarcation 
process when demarcating rural communities. In Limpopo province traditional leaders 
lamented the process and the outcomes of the MDB.118 This is because after the 
demarcation process rural areas are split apart or integrated with other communities as 
observed in Malamulele and Vuwani. Traditional leaders are found to be vocal against 
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the demarcation process and members of the community listen to them more than any 
government officials or the government itself.119  
In 1998, the Ndengeza community which is of Tsonga origin lodged a claim for a part of 
the Crystalfontein Farm 57 with the Restitution and Land Claims Commission and waited 
for the outcome of the restitution of land. However, after the completion of the municipal 
demarcation in the year 2000, the land under claim was split over two municipalities 
namely: the Great Giyani Municipality in the south and the Makhado Municipality in the 
north. The Ndengeza traditional leaders expressed their concern over the decision taken 
by the MDB and that they were not consulted during the demarcation process.120 In 2008, 
the traditional authority lodged its grievance with the Municipal Demarcation Board over 
the boundary and requested that the area be re-demarcated. The re-demarcation process 
was refused and the Makhado Municipality stated that they would lose government grants 
if their area were to be decreased during the demarcation process.121  
The traditional leaders in the area rejected both the demarcation process as well as the 
demarcation outcomes by the MDB. Such resistance led to serious tensions between the 
MDB, the municipality and the traditional leaders. This saw chiefs and political parties 
joining hands to try to bring closure on the splitting of traditional communities by the 
municipal demarcation process. The reason being that in many instances, new 
municipality boundaries cut across traditional tribal land and the introduction of local 
government on their lands would also diminish their own authority. Lehman highlights that 
prior to 1994 and the creation of local municipalities, traditional leaders exercised local 
government powers, yet the final constitution did not resolve the tension between 
recognition of the institution of traditional leadership and commitment to democracy in as 
afar as demarcation is concerned.122 The only way to resolve this will be to demarcate 
municipalities using ethnicity in areas where traditional leaders and traditional 
communities speak different languages. This means that ethnicity should be considered 
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in a few cases: only if there is an overlapping between traditional leaders and ethnicity. 
In a province such as KwaZulu-Natal, all traditional leaders are Zulu-Speakers. As a result 
traditional areas of a Zulu chief speaker should not be split between two municipalities as 
there are no ethnic differences. Only in Limpopo and Mpumalanga do traditional leaders 
belong to different ethnic groups. This means in such places ethnic differences (ethnicity) 
and the language spoken by traditional communities should be considered as a factor in 
demarcating municipal boundaries.  
 
3.10. Conclusion 
The legal framework set out the criteria to be used when demarcating municipal 
boundaries in South Africa. Through the MDB, the municipal demarcation process in 
South Africa transformed and shaped the system of local government. As a result, many 
communities including rural communities were demarcated to form part of municipal 
areas. This meant that rural communities would now be provided with municipal services 
within the municipality in which they fall.  However, not all communities were happy with 
the demarcation process because they fought against their amalgamation with other 
communities; some communities alleged lack of consultation by the DMB while others 
raised ethnic issues. In the Limpopo province, the demarcation process raised ethnic 
tensions as seen in the Malamulele and Vuwani communities.123  
Section 25 of the Municipal Demarcation Act explicitly provides that the Board must, when 
determining a municipal boundary, take into account areas of traditional rural 
communities. This means indirectly giving consideration to ethnic differences because 
many rural communities are under the leadership of different traditional leaders who 
speak different languages. Ethnicity can be considered in determining municipal 
boundaries if what is provided for in terms of section 25, is adhered to. This is because 
one cannot speak of traditional areas and exclude the language spoken in that area.  In 
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other words, by considering traditional communities as a factor, then the issue of 
language must also be considered. In a province such as Limpopo, there are three 
different ethnic groups sharing the province. Those ethnic groups are led by different 
traditional leaders and the language spoken is different, i.e. Sepedi, Tshivenda and 
Xitsonga. This means that when the demarcation process is undertaken in a province 
such as Limpopo, the traditional communities must be considered as a factor as provided 
for in the Municipal Demarcation Act, as well as the language spoken by that particular 
area. By looking at the provisions provided for in section 25, ethnicity can be considered 
indirectly as a factor in certain areas such as Limpopo.   
After analysing the municipal demarcation process in South Africa, the next chapter will 
focus on the system that was followed in Ethiopia, in determining both regional and local 
government boundaries. Ethiopia is a diversified nation with more than 80 ethnic groups 
and this makes it a good example and reference of this study. This is because Ethiopia 
has sought to accommodate its ethnic groups by demarcating internal boundaries using 
ethnicity at both the regional and local government level. The main focus will therefore be 
on both the system and structure followed in demarcating internal boundaries in Ethiopia. 
This study will also analyse the challenges faced when demarcating internal boundaries 
along ethnic lines at the regional and local government level. 
  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
42 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE USE OF ETHNICITY IN ETHIOPIA IN DETERMINIG INTERNAL BOUNDARIES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Ethiopia was never colonised by a European power but was occupied for a few years by 
Italy in 1936-41. It has been governed by several sovereign rulers (emperors) until the 
overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 which was followed by the dictatorship of 
Mengistu Hailemariam, the leader of the communist military junta, called the Derg.124  The 
first efforts to unify the state were made in the middle of the 19th century when the 
authoritarian regimes applied politics of nation-building in Ethiopia.125 It was after the 
defeat of the military regime that had ruled the country between 1947 and 1991, which 
saw Ethiopia experiencing a dramatic system change. 
In 1991, an ethno-nationalist group, led by the (TPLF) Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
and the (EPRDF)-Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front with other ethnic-
based movements, ousted the Derg regime and introduced a federal political system. The 
defeat of the Derg military-regime was thus achieved through a coalition of ethnic-based 
armed groups. This saw the principle of ethnic self-determination and a democratic order 
becoming a precondition for the maintenance of a polity within Ethiopia's boundaries, thus 
making space for diversity. After the military defeat of the Derg-regime, a complete shift 
in paradigm was undertaken. However, “instead of seeking unity through assimilation, 
unity was going to be achieved through the accommodation of diversities of all kinds as 
well as the granting of equal rights and status to all of the groups in the country 
(Ethiopia)”.126 Zimmermann-Steinhart and Bekele point out that between 1991 and 1995 
                                                             
124 Frank M ‘Effects of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia. Holding Together or Splitting Apart’ 2009 Ethnicity, Diversity 
and Democracy, EDG Project 2. 
125 Lukáš I ‘Language policy and process of nation-building in Ethiopia’ Available at 
http://alppi.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/00109.pdf (accessed 08 February 2017).  
126 Zimmermann-Steinhart P & Bekele Y ‘The implications of federalism and decentralisation on socioeconomic 
conditions in Ethiopia’ 2012(15) 2PER / PELJ 91. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
43 
 
Ethiopia was ruled on the basis of the "Transitional Charter" which provided for 
decentralised government and upheld the self-determination principle.127  
The Ethiopian federal arrangement is perceived to be unique in Africa because it is 
explicitly built on ethnicity.128 This is due to the fact that Ethiopia hosts more than 80 
different ethnic groups, most of them with their own unique culture, custom, belief and 
peculiar ways of doing things.129  
This led to the adoption of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia which established the nine 
regional states. None of the regional states in Ethiopia are ethnically pure, and only five 
regions are named after its numerically dominant ethnic group: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, 
Oromia and Somali. However, by using local government structures further ethnic groups 
have been accommodated. This strategy has its own challenges as different ethnic 
groups are fighting over limited resources - the exclusion of ethnic minorities in 
employment - as well as boundary tensions and constant conflicts amongst ethnic groups 
at regional and local government level.130 This chapter will therefore discuss the historical 
transition and the creation of regions in Ethiopia. Pursuant to that it will also discuss the 
legal framework and establishment of local government in Ethiopia, as well as the 
challenges faced at both the regional and local government levels. 
 
4.2. Historical transition of Ethiopia 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front being the core rebel group in Ethiopia fought an ethno-
regional liberation war from 1975-1991 and ended the long civil war in Ethiopia. The TPLF 
then promised a solution to the national question of inequalities in power, resources and 
cultural prestige between the various ethno-linguistic groups as well as the diffusion of 
regional and ethnic tensions. In 1990 the TPLF, broadened and grew into the Ethiopian 
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People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front which was a coalition of parallel parties to 
represent other parts of Ethiopia. It later broadened its programme nationwide with the 
desire and eagerness of creating a renewed, ‘revolutionary-democratic’ state, with more 
rights to be accorded to neglected ethnic minorities and language groups. The main aim 
was to establish a decentralised system and ethno-linguistically based federation instead 
of an enforced unitary state in Ethiopia.131  
In July 1991 a provisional Charter was adopted in Ethiopia and it gave a way for the birth 
or formation of what is known as the TGE (the Transitional Government of Ethiopia).132 
The Charter then accorded numerous nationalities in Ethiopia the right to self-
determination which also included the right to secession. The Charter was purposed to 
serve until a permanent constitution was drafted and popularly approved.133  
In 1995 the Ethiopian Federal Constitution was adopted and gave effect to the protection 
of all ethnic minority groups in Ethiopia. The constitution provided for the right to self-
determination of all ethnic groups and the creation of ethnic regions in Ethiopia to 
accommodate the county’s large ethnic groups. Ethnicity was thus central to the creation 
of ethnic-based subnational governments which could provide education, etc. This saw 
the minority groups using their languages for education purposes.134  
 
4.3. The creation of regions in Ethiopia 
One of the most consequential features of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia in as far 
as the creation of regions is concerned, is that the Federal Constitution makes ethnicity 
the sole criteria for organising regional states in Ethiopia, while on the other side it makes 
dominant ethnic groups that are dominant the owners of sovereign powers in the areas 
which falls under their jurisdiction.  According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 
“this arrangement prevents non-native ethnic groups from any share in the political life of 
the regions and has de facto and de jure created native ethnic sovereigns in each region 
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without recognising the existence and right of ethnic minorities. In other words, the 
regional states have been instruments for the exercise of a sovereign right to self-
government of native majority ethnic groups to the exclusion of other ethnic minorities 
living in those regions”.135 The Constitution in doing so it has therefore created a new 
system of domination of ethnic minority groups by dominant and native ethnic 
communities in Ethiopia.  In fact the Constitution has made minorities out of non- native 
or non-indigenous communities that have long inhabited the regions as their homeland.136 
The EPRDF government used the nationalities map of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities 
of 1983 to delineate preliminary boundaries between the ethnolinguistic areas in 
Ethiopia.137  In 1995, the constitution then provided for the establishment and creation of 
nine regions or regional states in Ethiopia, namely: Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Tigray, Somali, 
Harar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and the State of the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples (Southern Region of SNNPR).138 
The regions that were created in Ethiopia are ethnic-based regions, however, the only 
differences are that some have a dominant ethnic community whose name they bear 
while others are multi-ethnic with no numerically dominant ethnic community. It is worth 
noting that because Ethiopia is a home to 80 ethnic groups not every ethnic group can 
get a state. This resulted in regional states that are ethnically heterogeneous. For 
example, in regional states such as Gambela, South Regional and Benshagul-Gumz 
states, where multi-ethnic groups exist but no ethnic group is dominant, a mix of factors 
such as economic, political, settlement pattern, similarity of language and culture have 
been taken into consideration to an extent that ethnic minorities are also protected both 
at regional and local government level.139  
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Ayele and Fessha write that with the constitution allowing for the establishment of an 
ethnically defined territorial unit “in which members of an ethnic group can govern their 
own affairs”, the intention is to give effect to the right of ethnic groups to a full measure of 
self-government.140 It is therefore based on this principle that some of these regional 
states are designated as belonging to a particular ethnic group. 
It is worth noting that none of the regions in Ethiopia are ethnically homogenous. This is 
because some have minorities in regions with a dominant ethnic community while on the 
other hand; others have even minorities within minorities. This therefore created ethnic 
tensions between ethnic minorities and other dominant ethnic groups at regional level. 
There are many challenges and constant fights between different groups over limited 
resources at regional level. Some of these challenges that are experienced at regional 
level are somehow similar to those experienced at local government level. Some of the 
challenges experienced at both the regional and local government level will be discussed 
in details below. 
 
4.4. Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia 
Being a multi- ethnic state, Ethiopia observed numerous incidents of ethnic conflicts and 
tensions both at the local government and at the regional level. Because of the history of 
the country, the “current ethnic federal arrangement was in fact created to do away with 
suppression and the legacies of ethnic domination, while at the same time providing for 
a constitutional and legal framework for the resolution and mitigation of ethnic 
conflicts”.141  
However, the creation of the ethnic federal system in Ethiopia had its own limitations.  
“Ethnic federalism brought new dimensions that often aggravated and complicated 
ethnic conflicts in the country. By making ethnic groups the building blocks of the 
country’s federal system, the new arrangement elevated the importance of ethnic 
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identity as a key instrument to claim social, economic and political resources. 
Accordingly, ethnicity and ethnic identities have been used as flagships for mass 
mobilization in group conflicts. Some of these are often waged by the local elite to 
secure political power based on ethnic distinctiveness. As a result, those conflicts 
manifest themselves in the form of disputes over geo-political (regional, zonal or 
special woreda) boundaries”.142 
Although many Government reports indicate that incitement and ethnic violence are 
prohibited by law, in practice incidents of ethnic based violence have been on the increase 
in Ethiopia in the last two years. Therefore, by looking at the history of ethnic conflicts in 
Ethiopia, recent conflicts can be classified into four or more categories. However, in most 
cases, such categorization will depend largely on the identity of the parties involved in the 
conflicts and the cause of each conflicts between the parties. It is worth noting that some 
of these conflicts include setter versus native conflicts and clashes over power-sharing 
as well as resources-based conflicts. Since resource-based conflicts are customarily 
being presented as boundary disputes, they will however, not be discussed as a separate 
concept in this study.143 
 
4.4.1. Boundary-Related ethnic conflicts  
According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council:  
“the establishment of other administrative units and regions in Ethiopia along 
ethnic lines required drawing boundaries between ethnic communities which in the 
past, had geographically been interspersed through diverse and long-standing 
patterns of settlement. As a result, the physical demarcation of geographical 
borders between the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia was difficult since there 
have been considerable population movements in many parts of the country. In 
redrawing the regional states, the concern of where the physical border between 
the national communities should be drawn has led to disputes and tensions in the 
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country. Ethnic conflicts often resulted in civilians being attacked and robbed by 
virtue of their connection and membership to a certain ethnic group”.144  
It is true that many of these ethnic minorities or communities had experienced a small 
scale resource-based conflicts in the past. However, the introduction of the ethnic federal 
system in country (Ethiopia) changed the dynamics of these conflicts and tensions by 
reinforcing their ethnic dimension. Furthermore, “the fact that the disputed areas 
coincided with the boundaries of regional governments has transformed the conflict 
between local communities into conflicts between regional states”.145 Some instances or 
illustrations that includes the claim of ownership over the Babile town (between the 
Oromiya and Somali regional states), the Borena and Gari conflict between the Somali 
and Oromia regional states, as well as the conflict between the Gedeo in the SNNPR 
state and the Gujji Oromo in Oromia regional states; these also includes the conflict 
between the Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz regional states, etc.146  
According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, “the major hindrance to a lasting 
resolution of such conflicts in Ethiopia is the fact that the boundaries between these 
regions or ethno-national communities are not clearly demarcated. There has been no 
systematic effort by the Government to delineate the boundaries in a clear manner, often 
because the tension is very high in the disputed territories”.147 
As a result, “the absence of a specialized government authority to assume the 
responsibility of attending to disputes between members of different ethnic groups living 
in adjacent regions has continued to give rise to frequent conflicts and tension in different 
parts of the country, often resulting in the death and displacement of many citizens and 
destruction of public and private property”.148 
Article 48(1) of the Constitution states that:  
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“all border disputes shall be settled by agreement of the concerned states. Where 
the states fail to reach agreement, the House of Federation shall decide such 
disputes on the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the people 
concerned”.149 
However, in many cases the principles that are stipulated in the Constitution are not 
implemented and some issues regarding border conflicts between ethnic communities 
are also not adequately addressed. In trying to find a suitable remedy in as far as border 
conflicts are concerned, it is worth noting that the ad-hoc inter-regional border committees 
which is coordinated by the Ministry of Federal Affairs usually attempts to resolve 
boundary related issues in Ethiopia.150  
Even though there is an attempt to settle boundary related issues in Ethiopia, the 
unfortunate part is that members of the ad-hoc inter-regional border committees are from 
the ruling elite of some of the regions which are also having claims over territories and 
these results in them being biased and lacking neutrality.  
This has complicated the matter further and had resulted in the settlement of boundary 
disputes been a lengthy and inexpedient process due to failure of the committee members 
to reach an agreement. For example, attempts to resolve boundary disputes between the 
Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz, Afar and Somali, Oromia and Somali and regions are 
wearisome and have been dragging for years.151 
Ethiopian Human Rights Council highlight that “despite its constitutional mandate to 
resolve these disputes, the House of Federation was not able to give a decision on these 
and similar cases due to serious human and technical capacity constraints. There is also 
a lack of clarity regarding the role of the House of Federation and the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs in this regard, leading to confusion as to which federal institution has the lead role 
in managing and resolving ethnic conflicts”.152  
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4.4.2. Competition over limited resources 
Boundary disputes are linked to competition over limited resources by different ethnic 
groups (both at the local government and regional level). The reason for limited resources 
is population pressures at regional level between different ethnic groups, environmental 
degradation as well as climate change.153 Improper agricultural practices and soil erosion 
have greatly damaged the land’s productivity. The rate of food production is also declining 
at an alarming rate as compared to an increasing population growth rate in the country.154 
The competition over limited or scarce natural resources is influenced by struggle for 
political power at regional level. This saw the agro-pastoral areas being in a state of 
instability due to competition over scarce resources.155 
The Somali and Oromo regions and the Ittu and Issa clans have become the areas that 
are hit by serious conflict over limited resources.  The introduction as well as the 
implementation of ethnic-based boundaries in Ethiopia led to the issue of administrative 
boundaries between the Oromo and Somali regions, in general including the Ittu and Issa 
clans in particular became a source of conflict.156 The major causes for conflict in these 
regions are cattle raiding, competition over declining resources and territorial 
expansionary moves.  
Tenaw writes that stock of natural resources especially water points as well as grazing 
lands in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas are shrinking from time to time due to several 
factors, including expansion of agriculture, human and animal population growth, 
environmental degradation and the occurrence of prolonged drought.157 Tenaw further 
highlights that there are no doubts that the above mentioned factors intensify resource 
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scarcity in Ethiopia as well as competition for water sources and pastures in the regional 
level among the pastoralists.158  
It is worth noting that for pastoralism to survive there is a necessity for them to move 
within and across regional boundaries in search of drinking water and grazing-pastures 
for their livestock. However, currently the situation has not been conducive for them to 
move anywhere across the regional boundaries due to enmity among ethnic groups. Such 
enmity among ethnic groups resulted in three major conflicts which took place ever since 
the year 2000 between major rival pastoral groups, such as the Borena and Gari; the 
Merihan and Digidia, as well as between the Degidia and Borena in Oromia region. This 
saw hundreds of people losing their lives because of these conflicts.159 
In trying to resolve these resource competitions at regional level, territorial expansion 
became one of the main or major strategies of control over scarce resources. However, 
such boundary claims strategies resulted in various violent conflict between the two clans 
in the Omali/Oromia area. Taha writes that: 
“In 2004, Somali Region claims that 21 kebeles which are the small units of 
administration in a district should fall within its regional administrations. These 
events led to a referendum in November 2004, which allocated only one of the 
contested kebeles to Somali regional state and the remaining twenty to Oromia 
regional state. As a result, the Issa and other Somali clans were not satisfied about 
the result and they made indiscriminate violent attacks on Ittu clans”.160  
Oba highlights that scarce resource competition and cattle raids between Ittu and Issa 
clan groups have resulted in conflicts ever since the 1960s. As a result the pastoralists 
are now facing more pressures and challenges than ever before because of:  
“the loss of pasturelands to national parks, private farms, and raches; increased 
commoditisation with concomitant inequality within the livestock economy; 
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changes to other types of land use; out-migration of poor pastoralists as well as 
periodic dislocations brought about by drought, famine, and civil war”.161 
Basso points out that the recent inter-ethnic and clan conflicts in Ethiopia are related to 
national political processes. The main reason being the absence of clearly demarcated 
zonal, district, kebele and regional level boundaries in eastern Ethiopia. These therefore 
led to tense or solidified competition and territorial expansive moves by several ethnic 
groups. However, in trying to resolve these boundary disputes, in 2004 the two regional 
state government of Somali and Oramia tried to come up with a referendum, unfortunately 
all these efforts did not bring any long-lasting solution.162  
 
4.4.3. Power Sharing conflicts  
The use of ethnicity as deciding factor for the distribution of political authority and power 
or as a major criterion for demarcating boundaries at the regional levels customarily led 
to or created serious competition over political power among and between different ethnic 
groups in Ethiopia.163 Such arrangements became problematic at the regional level 
because ethnic group’s access to power also guaranteed them better access to economic 
resources and superiority over other ethnic groups. Furthermore, ethnic arrangements 
led to the exclusion of non-native groups: the process which gave rise to rivalries and 
competition between native-ethnic groups for political power; which in turn led to violent 
conflicts (power sharing conflicts) especially in the Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz 
regions.164  
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4.4.4. Conflicts between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities 
As highlighted above, the relation between the settlers and native communities in the 
different regions in Ethiopia is fraught with serious tensions. Pursuant to that there are 
several factors that contributed to these tensions. Amongst others these factors include: 
discrimination; the disenfranchisement and lack of political representation of settler 
‘minorities’ as well as native resentment towards settlers due to the past history of 
domination. They also include “economic insecurity due to increased migration and 
presence of settlers; fear of displacement and parochial sentiments of ownership and 
territoriality among native ethnic groups”.165  
As a result, serious conflicts ensued because of these tensions with many people losing 
their lives, and thousands of them being displaced because their properties were 
destroyed. Pursuant to that the omission of and failure to act on the part of the Federal 
and regional authorities somehow exacerbated these conflicts and contributed to the 
worsening of damages (destruction of properties). It is therefore worth noting that these 
tensions where mostly documented as discriminatory actions toward the ‘minority’ 
Amharic speakers. Furthermore, such conflicts are recorded as two conflicts which took 
place in Eastern Wollenga zone of the Oromia and Gambella region.166 
These saw local Oromo elites mobilising native community and solicited to xenophobic 
and territorial sentiments by reigniting historical memories of suppression and domination 
by the Amhara. Based on that the local administrators then influenced the Oromo 
community to evict the Amhara setters and agitated that they be send to their native 
region by claiming that like their ancestors “the Amhara’s were trying to rob Oromia by 
occupying the land and depriving their children of the future livelihood”.167  
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4.4.5. Language and political tension  
The Constitution of Ethiopia guarantees equality of languages and empowers regions to 
determine their own official working languages. As a result, some regions adopted 
languages of ethnic groups that are dominating in the regions as working languages. 
Such adoption meant that all aspects of judiciary, including the administrative and other 
affairs of the region are to be conducted in the language of a certain ethnic group.168  
Consequently, in as far as education is concerned this means that it must also be provided 
in the language of that particular region. This principle is also attached to the right to 
representation, access to employment including access to justice etc. The literacy in 
language of dominant ethnic group is therefore being used as a tool of accessibility at the 
regional level or some areas. Though these can be appreciated as a positive 
arrangements for the realization of ethno-linguistic groups which have sovereign powers 
at the regional state, the fate of those minority groups or communities who are unable to 
speak the language of the dominant ethnic groups as well as native groups requires 
serious attention and needs to be addressed urgently. Some of the communities which 
need to be accommodated included indigenous communities as well as settler 
communities whose language have been denied the status of being recognised as an 
official language. This is because members of the above mentioned communities will face 
serious difficulties in the exercise of their human rights because of their illiteracy in the 
regional working languages.169 
 
4.5. Ethnic local governments in Ethiopia 
The Constitution of Ethiopia provides for constitutional autonomy for the regions which 
includes the “power to draft, adopt and amend the regional state constitution”.170 This 
allows regions the opportunity to protect subnational ethnic minorities and accommodate 
regional ethnic pluralism. Tarr highlights that Ethiopia’s Federal Constitution (the Federal 
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Constitution) leaves the “regions with considerable constitutional space to design their 
institutions and local governments”.171 This is due to the fact that local or (sub-regional) 
government is scarcely touched upon by the Federal Constitution. The regions are 
therefore autonomous in determining or establishing their institutional structure 
organisation and competencies of local government. Van der Beken highlights that each 
of the nine regions in Ethiopia has successfully managed to adopt an effective constitution 
that acknowledges the existence of different ethnic minorities at regional level. The 
majority of these regions have also designed the institutions of “local government as the 
primary mechanism of protecting sub-national ethnic minorities”.172  
Ayele and Fessha point out that “the right to self-government is not limited to the ethnic 
groups that have their own regional states: rather, it is a right that is constitutionally 
reserved to all or almost every ethnic groups in the country”.173  Article 47(2) of the 
constitution states that ethnic communities within the states “have the right to establish, 
at any time, their own States”.174 Therefore, the right to self-government or determination 
means that ethnic communities have the right to “exercise their right to self-determination, 
which includes the right to establish government institutions in the territory” in which they 
reside and also within the territorial boundaries of the regional state in which they are 
situated.175 
Ayele writes that the reason for decentralisation in Ethiopia was to empower ethnic 
minorities and thereby mitigate or prevent ethnic conflicts.176 This meant that any ethnic 
related issues and questions which were not answered and cannot be dealt with through 
the medium of regional state formation will have to addressed via the establishment of 
local government.177 
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The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia thus provides explicitly for the establishment and 
determination of two types of sub-regional government in terms of articles 39(3) and 50(4) 
respectively.178 Article 39 (3) implicitly provides for the establishment and implementation 
of autonomous sub-regional territorial units with the main aim of accommodating intra-
regional ethnic minorities in the country. Pursuant to that this means that what is stipulated 
in article 39(3) is an autonomous local government that is empowered with powers that 
are relevant in protecting and promoting the interest of all ethnic communities on whose 
behalf it is established.179 
Local government in terms of article 39 as stated above is a local government whose 
territorial boundary is largely delimited along ethnic lines.180 As stated by Ayele and 
Fessha:  
The boundaries of article 39 local governments are to be demarcated based on 
the settlement pattern of an ethnic group whose aspiration for self-government 
could not be met through the establishment of a regional state. This means that 
article 39 local governments can only be established for an ethnic group that is 
geographically concentrated.181  
Article 50(4) obliges the regional states to establish government units below state level. 
However, as stated above regional states have the power to enact their own constitution 
and to establish local government. The Amhara Constitution established an ethnic-based 
local government with one purpose of protecting sub-regional ethnic minorities. This 
approach has also been adopted and followed by the Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and 
Southern Region in their Constitutions.182 
Currently there are only five regions that have established ethnic local government in 
Ethiopia; there are still several state constitutions which do not recognise ethnic diversity 
including Somali and Oromia state constitutions. These ethnic-based local governments 
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are designed in such a way that they offer important protection to the cultural rights 
including language rights of the concerned ethnic minorities. The competence of the 
ethnic-based local governments in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Amhara and 
Southern Region allows local governments to determine their working language which is 
used mainly for official purposes in the local administration and judiciary.183  
For example, the SNNPR is home to dozens of ethnic groups and in order to respond to 
the constitutional requirement of ensuring self-government for the different ethnic groups, 
the regional constitution has established ethnically defined zonal administrations.184 The 
Amhara state has also established three special zones (or Nationality Administrations) 
for the three indigenous minorities (i.e. the Agew Himra, Awi and Oromo). Similar 
administrative entities are provided for the five indigenous minorities in Benishangul-
Gumuz. The Gambella constitution also provides for the establishment of a Nationality 
Zone for the three indigenous minorities of Anuak, Nuer and Mejenger.185  
Fessha and Van der Beken argue that Ethiopian “ethnic-based local government 
administrations offer excellent” opportunities for participation and institutional 
representation for the empowerment of minority. 186 Ethnic local government is 
established at both the zonal and woreda level known as liyu-woreda (special districts).187   
Depending on the level of ethnic diversity, the regional states have established three 
Local Governments (LGs) tiers. According to Baraki, “two pragmatic approaches have 
been applied in the delimitation of local governments into the Zones, Special Zones, 
Special Woredas, and Woreds. Zonal governments and Special Woreda governments 
comprise several rural and urban woreda governments”.188  As such, in the 
heterogeneous states of Southern Region (SNNP), Benshagul-Gumuz and Gambela, 
Zonal and Special Wereda Governments are mainly established along ethnic lines 
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regardless of their economic viability. In the SNNP, Zonal Governments (ZGs) and 
Special Woreda Governments (SWGs) are formed by breaking up heterogeneous 
Zone/Woreda Administrations. Baraki highlights further that “when a single ethnic group 
is found to be very tiny; two or more ethnic groups were brought together to form a SWG 
or ZG, often based on language and cultural similarities”.189 
According to Ayele and Fessha, zonal administrations are not even recognised in the 
regional constitutions, other than in the constitution of Oromia regional state, yet it is 
established in most regions. However, its main purpose is to serve as an intermediate 
point between a woreda and regional government. 190 
The most powerful tier in terms of article 50(4) local government is the intermediate local 
government known as woreda. A woreda is created through the regional constitutions 
and it is established throughout the rural areas of the country. As a result, a woreda has 
a council: a legislative organ comprising of members that are directly elected by the 
people. Ayele and Fessha highlight that: 
Equivalent of a woreda in urban areas is a city administration, which is an equally 
autonomous local government. The deliberative arm of the city administration is 
the city council, comprising of members that are directly elected by the residents 
of each city administration is the city council. A city administration has a mayor, a 
mayoral committee, a professional municipal manager, a municipal judicial organ 
and a municipal administrative court.191 
It is worth noting that urban local government is created through regional statutes as 
opposed to a woreda which is created through regional constitutions.  
The article 39 local governments are established to address ethnic claims or 
accommodate ethnic communities within some sort of territorial framework. Though these 
types of local governments have been established at the different levels in the hierarchy 
of local government these organisations are mostly established at the zonal and woreda 
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levels and are consequently known as the nationality zones and liyu-woreda (special 
districts).  
It is worth highlighting that nationality zones are established as institutions of self-
government for regional minority groups that occupies a territorial area covering a number 
of woredas. While on the other hand, a liyu woreda is a subdivision of a region which in 
terms of territorial and population size is comparable to a woreda administration and is 
established for a particular ethnic group that inhabits the area.192 
There is thus a clear difference between nationality zones and liyu woredas with the rest 
of local governments established in the country. Ayele and Fessha point out that: 
In the Amhara regional state, the region is largely inhabited by individuals who 
belong to the Amhara ethnic group. However, within the regional boundaries of the 
Amhara regional states are pockets of territory that are dominated by the Himra, 
Awi (the two strand of the Agew ethnic group) and Oromo.193 
In order to accommodate all these three ethnic communities, the Amhara regional state 
has established three nationality zones. The same can be said about the Afar regional 
state.  
Ayele and Fessha further write that  
In contrast, the constitution has established regional states that are ethnically 
heterogeneous, with no single ethnic group accounting for the majority of the 
regional population. In these regional states, the claims for recognition and self-
rule by ethnic communities have resulted in the regional governments establishing, 
depending on the size of the ethnic community, either being a nationality zone or 
a liyu woredas.194  
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Currently, the SNNPR has established fourteen nationality zones and eight liyu woredas. 
The same has been established in ethnically diverse Bensinshangul and Gambella 
regional state.  
The Constitution of Afar region recognises the right of the minority of people who belong 
to Argoba to “have their own “special woreda” in the region”. In the Amhara region there 
are also special zones for a minority from the Oromo ethnic group. The Constitution of 
the Southern region is also designed in such a way that recognises the “special woreda” 
as an ethnic based sub-regional local government administration.195  
It is worth noting that the territorial demarcation of both the nationality zone and a liyu 
woreda follows the territorial settlement of the ethnic group on whose behalf they are 
established. As a result, these ethnic local government units are autonomous and should 
the ethnic group for which they are established choose to secede from the region and 
establish their own regional state they can do so.196  Currently, nationality zones and liyu 
woredas are established only in five regions such as the Afar, SNNPR, Amhara, 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions.  
Liyu woreda is found only in four regions of Amhara, SNNPR, Gambella and Benishagul-
Gumuz. In SNNPR there are nine liyu woredas that were established. Whereas, in 
Benishagul-Gumuz there are two liyu woredas, one in Gambella known as Godre liyu 
woreda and one in Afar known as Argoba liyu woreda.197 
It is therefore worth concluding by stating that nationality zones in Ethiopia are mainly 
established as institutions of self-government, for regional ethnic minority groups that 
occupy a territorial area covering a number of woredas.198 Whereas a liyu woreda (special 
district), is a subdivision of regions which in terms of territorial and population size is 
comparable to a Woreda administration.199 It is established for the particular ethnic groups 
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that inhabits the area. Nationality zones and liyu woredas are established only in five 
regions: Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella regions and SNNPR.200  
 
4.6. Challenges, ethnic tensions and conflicts at local level in Ethiopia 
According to Van der Beken, the main idea in the establishment of ethnic-based local 
government in Ethiopia is that “through these local governments system, the concerned 
ethnic minorities can exercise the self-rule component of the right to self-
determination”.201  Although the above facts managed to indicate the opportunities offered 
by the mechanism of establishing ethnic-based local governments in Ethiopia with the 
main purpose of fulfilling the rights of sub-national ethnic minorities, in practice this 
mechanism has substantial challenges, tensions, conflicts as well as limitations. Some of 
the limitation highlighted above relates to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the ethnic-
based local governments in the exercise of their powers. The challenges brought by 
ethnic-based local government in Ethiopia are:  
a) Land disputes between ethnic groups which includes contestation over district 
boundaries; and 
b) Ethnic mobilisation and competition over resources 
 
4.6.1. Land disputes at the local government level 
Some of the challenges that are faced at the regional level are somehow similar to those 
that are experienced at the local government level. The land issue in Ethiopia “constitutes 
one of the most contentious issues because it involves conflicting political, socio-cultural 
and economic interests”.202 However, the point of contestation in Ethiopia’s ethnic-based 
local government level is as a result of who holds power or authority in the regional 
administration as well as who has the right over which land in the region. According to 
Abbink “the majority of tensions and challenges in rural Ethiopia emanated from disputes 
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with regard to land and the boundaries of (woredas) districts and zones between the 
newly defined ethnic or linguistic groups”.203  
This is because “after ethno-linguistic or ethnic identity was accorded an organising role 
in the determination of boundaries and adoption of policies, the new political dispensation 
was immediately used as a means to make claims to resources on both the national 
(state) level and local level (especially government funding and land)”.204 This started with 
sophisticated negotiations and ethnic positioning strategies of ethnic elites to enable them 
to get advantages at the expenses of other groups. Land and borders in Ethiopia became 
the prime cornerstone of contestation. Due to soil erosion and population growth in 
Ethiopia, land had become an increasingly scarce resource. This saw contestations over 
land and borders being backed up by an explicit reference to language and cultural 
differences.205  Other recurring factors with regard to land include:  
“The disagreements about the possession of or use rights to water resources, 
prestige, land, and cultural policies (feelings of inter-group superiority and 
inferiority), settlement, licences for investment and language policy in education 
and administration”.206 
Land issues lead to a high level of contestation over district boundaries in Ethiopia. This 
is the result of the competition over grazing space and water for livestock leading to 
sporadic cases of cattle rustling and revenge killings. These therefore led to other minority 
groups having limited access to services in areas that are dominated by rival ethnic 
groups. This resulted in ethnic mobilisation at the lower level. In many areas, minority 
groups re-negotiated local relationships and mobilised people to fight for recognition as 
'nationality' or ethnic groups in order to take advantage of the new political order in 
Ethiopia. As a result, they used the constitutional status of the nationalities to pursue their 
goals.207 
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Ethnic mobilisation usually results in different ethnic groups competing with each other 
over limited resources. Competition for resources in Ethiopia had shown itself primarily in 
the form of pastoralist conflicts and clashes over scarce resources of land. The reason 
being that pastoralist conflicts have a lengthy history and occurred in the lowland areas 
of the country mostly in the Afar, Oromia, and Somalia regions.208 Feyisaa highlights that: 
There is a constant fight between the Nuer and Anywaa over privileges, over 
federal funds, over representation in the regional state government and land for 
pasture (Nuer) or agriculture (Anywaa). The two major groups dominate the local 
arena of politics and are locked in violent rivalry against each other. Furthermore, 
he highlight that “the basic claim of the Anywaa is that they are the original 
inhabitants of the area and that most of the Nuer are newcomers from the Sudan, 
who should not dominate and occupy Anywaa lands along the Baro River”.209  
While different ethnic groups are in competition with each other over limited resources, 
the major challenge of local government in the regional level is the allocation of federal 
funds between different ethnic groups and representation at the regional level which 
resulted in political repression.210  
The majority of conflicts in Ethiopia now are mostly about boundaries between different 
territorialised ethnic groups. This is because fights are waged about identity in order to 
establish the borders of districts and zones. Unfortunately, the identity professed by ethnic 
communities (local people) is the deciding element. Because of ethnic difference between 
ethnic communities, different areas are given to each ethnic group but that does not stop 
the conflict. This led to unhappiness about how the boundaries have been drawn. 
Boundaries are tied up with ethnic identity as well as a conflict about resources in the 
disputed border areas. Abbink writes that “that is ‘secession’ in miniature form; however 
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some of the conflicts are about power or authority and access to scarce resources in a 
shared arena”.211  
Despite its promise and claims to bring a long lasting solution, the post-1991 regime in 
Ethiopia did not succeed, in that it had failed tremendously to mitigate and to manage 
ethnic tensions in the country. In simple terms, it has decentralised most of the problems 
faced in Ethiopia by defining the root cause of conflicts to be at the local and not at the 
national level.212 This cannot be true because there are other serious problems that are 
affecting or are of great concern to the national government, such as minority exclusivity 
in employment and political privileges, etc.  
 
4.6.2.  Minority exclusion in employment.  
One of the challenges faced by Ethiopia is the exclusion of ethnic minorities in as far as 
employment is concerned, resulting in a serious lack of employment for minority groups 
at the regional level.213 This is because they are usually considered as not being part of 
the dominant ethnic group. This is irrespective of them knowing the local language or 
even having resided in the region for a long time. Because there is high unemployment, 
there is also high level of competition over resources in Ethiopia. This has led to the 
exclusion of ethnic minorities with regard to employment. 214  
 
4.6.3. Political privileges 
Political identity in Ethiopia fostered intra-ethnic solidarity as well as reinforcing inter-
ethnic boundary in the country. However, “the same process has also raised serious 
problems of where to draw the line in the definition of the ‘self’ and engendered intra-
ethnic competition for resources and political power”.215  As a result, the repercussion of 
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institutionalised identity politics does not end at the migrants and inter-ethnic or indigenes 
level. It has also introduced social displacement within the ethnic groups magnifying and 
politicising sub-ethnic units.216   
“Political representation is a quarrelsome issue played out in power struggles 
between political elites at all levels of government in Ethiopia, affecting the stability 
of the regional states. Power struggles are expressed through inter-ethnic and 
clan-based conflicts and tensions”.217 
According to Feyissa, due to political privileges experienced by dominant ethnic groups, 
“multi-ethnic regional states are ‘up for grabs’ for the various groups who compete for 
resources and political power with various narratives of entitlement instead of building a 
viable regional political community”.218  
By so saying, the struggle for political power and competition over limited resources 
among the ethnic elites in Ethiopia is a reflection of the contentious issue of political 
ownership of the multi-ethnic regional states such as Gambella. Conflict situations in the 
Gambella region are “also related to the introduction of territorialized ethnicity and the 
politicisation of migration”.219 Resources are allocated according to political affiliation and 
between ethnic lines.  
  
4.6.4. The challenges of establishing ethnic boundaries in Ethiopia 
The organization of state power along territorially based ethnic communities has been 
reinforced and elevated to a constitutional level.220 The Ethiopian federation is unique in 
many aspects, insofar as it departs radically from the usual fear of African states to ‘play 
with fire’ i.e. ethnicity.221  Despite some serious debates among different scholars, those 
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who are in favour pointed out: that federalism was the best (in other words, the only) 
solution to Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity problem.222 Customary law has always been 
instrumental in handling disputes and regulating the livelihood of the Ethiopians and it is 
continual being used in the same manner even today in the country.223  
However, according to the rejectionist of ethnic federalism, ethnic based federalism has 
the propensity to divide the people ethnically and elevate normal competition for 
resources to the level of ethnic strife and inter- and intra-ethnic mistrust.224 Ethiopian 
ethnic federalism gives support to (or encourages) political parties to organise along 
ethnic lines and to maintain or enforce an ethnicised federal state in Ethiopia.225  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
The Constitution of Ethiopia says almost nothing regarding the place and status of local 
government. This is because the local government structure is to be regulated in the 
regional states' constitutions. However, in terms of Article 50(4) the Federal Constitution 
requires states to transfer adequate power to lower levels of government. Furthermore, 
in terms of Article 39(3) it also “grants each ethno-national group the right to a full measure 
of self-government, which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the 
territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in State and Federal 
governments". 
Regions in Ethiopia were established based on ethnic differences and diversity of the 
country. This provided regions also with the power to determine or establish their local 
government based on their ethnic identity. It should be noted that “although the regions 
enjoy considerable constitutional space to design specific devices, the major 
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constitutional tool for minority protection at regional level is invariably the establishment 
of ethnic-based local governments”.226 
This enabled Ethiopia to establish at local government system that is ethnic-based, to 
accommodate all ethnic minorities. However, Ethiopia is now experiencing ethnic 
tensions between members of different ethnic groups that are fighting over limited 
resources. Such ethnic tensions are due to the greediness of the dominant ethnic groups 
either at the regional or local government level that refuses to or are not willing to share 
resources with other ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions are also due to limited resources in 
the country which led to ethnic mobilisation.  
After the establishments of the woredas, “they became responsible for preparing and 
implementing developmental plans and the distribution of resources without seeking 
authorisation from higher levels, through the woreda block grant transfers”.227 However, 
the grants which are given to the woredas are also limited and this makes it difficult for 
the woredas to provide communities with proper services. This gave rise to ethnic 
challenges and tensions amongst ethnic minorities. 
Though there are challenges at the local government level in Ethiopia, South Africa can 
learn one or two things from Ethiopia as the establishment of regions and local 
government has some advantages:  
a) Ethiopia has managed to accommodate ethnic minorities by demarcating regional 
boundaries along ethnic lines and ethnic communities, and 
b) It has also managed to accommodate ethnic minorities by establishing ethnic local 
government.  
Some of the disadvantages of the system that is followed by Ethiopia are that there is a 
constant conflict between ethnic communities over regional boundaries. The 
determination of boundaries within ethnic lines resulted in conflicts which gave rise to 
ethnic mobilisation, land dispute and contestation over limited resources. There is also 
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livestock and property looting between ethnic communities as well as minority exclusion 
in employment, etc. 
Cohen is of the view that in recognising ethnicity for what it is, Ethiopia is sitting on an 
ethnic time bomb and it must come up with a possible solution.228 However, according to 
Abbink, pessimists argue that it may already be too late for the re-drafting of the 
constitution in Ethiopia because “among the generation coming to maturity since 1991, 
new identities have already been formed and are being internalised” by local people.229  
Ethiopia has now declared a state of emergency due to violent protests which led to the 
killing of hundreds of people. This is because ethnicity has been mobilized in the contest 
for resource, and ethnicity has been built into the system. Ethnic minority groups alleged 
repression and exclusivity from resources by the dominating ethnic groups.  
This shows that the main problem in Ethiopia is power sharing and equitable distribution 
of resources between or among ethnic lines or groups. Some of the problems faced by 
Ethiopia includes political mobilisation by ethnic minorities and the exclusion of minorities 
in as far as employment is concerned.  
To eradicate demarcation tensions and protests South Africa should follow Ethiopia’s 
example by demarcating municipalities using ethnicity. The South African Constitution 
provides for the establishment of municipalities in the territory of the republic and also 
provides for the equitable distribution of the revenues raised nationally. This means that 
should South Africa follow the Ethiopian example, it will still be financially viable and still 
manage to provide municipal services between ethnic communities.  Demarcating 
municipalities along ethnic lines will be the best system to eradicate demarcation tensions 
and protest in South Africa.  
By using ethnicity as a factor to demarcate municipal boundaries in South Africa: the 
starting point will be by looking first at the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the  
challenges faced in Ethiopia by using ethnicity as a factor in demarcating internal 
boundaries. What follows this chapter is the conclusion and recommendation of the whole 
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study. The conclusion will be based on the entire study and shall be followed by the 
recommendation of the study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The question raised in this study is: should ethnicity be used as a factor in demarcating 
municipalities in South Africa?  
This question came pertinently to the fore in the cases of Malamulele and Vuwani in the 
Limpopo province. In this case ethnicity proved to be the main issue or factor in the 
Malamulele community when its community members raised ethnic concerns against the 
Thulamela Local Municipality.  
Community members protested and demanded their own separate municipality away 
from the Venda-speaking communities in the Thulamela Local Municipality. Once there 
was a concession to the Malamulele community and they achieved a separate 
municipality, the Vuwani community members also fought against their incorporation in 
the new Malamulele municipality by raising ethnic concerns against the Municipal 
Demarcation Board stating that they will not receive municipal services in the new 
Malamulele municipality because they are Venda-speakers while the community of 
Malamulele in general is a Xitsonga-speaking community.   
Even though these two communities raised ethnic concerns against each other, the 
Municipal Demarcation Board incorporated the community of Vuwani in the new 
Malamulele municipality while the community wanted to remain being part of the Makhado 
Local Municipality. This saw ethnicity becoming an issue which challenged the MB in the 
demarcation of Malamulele and Vuwani.   
However, the Municipal Demarcation Board continued with the demarcation process by 
amalgamating these two communities into one municipality. As a result, the decision by 
the Municipal Demarcation Board to provide the Malamulele community with a new 
municipality and the refusal by both communities to form part of a municipality that is 
dominated by a different ethnic group clearly proved that ethnic differences is emerging 
at the local government level in South Africa. 
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Pursuant to that this decision proved to be a time-ticking ethnic bomb because it led to 
riots and protests that saw schools being burned. As such, it will be proper to conclude 
that ethnic differences between these two communities led to tensions around municipal 
demarcation.     
However, the Municipal Demarcation Board denied that it provided the Malamulele 
community with its own municipality away from the Thulamela Local Municipality, 
although the MDB implicitly used the ethnicity of the two communities as a factor in 
demarcating municipal boundaries.   
The use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal boundaries in South Africa is a process 
which is formally denied by the Municipal Demarcation Board. However, by looking at the 
case of Malamulele, initially the decision was taken not to give the community of 
Malamulele its own municipality because the MDB did not want to establish ethnic 
municipalities. Later the decision was reversed and the community was given its own 
municipality away from the Venda-speaking community. The new municipality included 
some parts of Makhado which is a Venda dominated area. This led to ethnic tensions by 
the community of Vuwani, fighting against its incorporation into the new Malamulele 
municipality.  
As a result, the Municipal Demarcation Board’s decision to amalgamate these two 
communities of Malamulele and Vuwani proved that ethnicity was considered and used 
as a factor. Though it was not acknowledged in writing that ethnicity was used as a factor, 
the decision itself proves that ethnicity was considered as a factor in providing the 
community of Malamulele with its own municipality.  
It is best to acknowledge that the MDB has so far managed to carry out its constitutional 
mandate of demarcating municipalities in South Africa with considerable success. 
However, there has been a lot of contestation by community members against the 
Municipal Demarcation Board’s demarcation process as well as the demarcation 
outcomes. 
Due to apartheid experiences, there is fear that if ethnicity is considered as a factor it will 
divide the country and be a return to the old apartheid system of ethnic-based Bantustans. 
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However, by acknowledging it in the case of Vuwani and Malamulele proves that using 
ethnicity as a factor in determining municipal boundaries will limit service delivery protest 
by members of different ethnic groups against each other.  
The question posed initially: should ethnicity be used as a factor in demarcating 
municipalities in South Africa? This was answered in the affirmative. The next question 
that one can ask is whether the Municipal Demarcation Act provides for the use of 
ethnicity in determining municipal boundaries or not. And if it does not, should it be 
included?  
The Act is silent in section 25 on the use of ethnicity as a factor in demarcating municipal 
boundaries. However, it indirectly allows for it by making reference to traditional 
authorities.  
The answer to the above question is yes: it does allow for the use of ethnicity indirectly. 
This is because section 25(f) indirectly allows for the use of ethnicity in determining 
municipal boundaries by taking into account traditional communities. This section 
provides explicitly that the MDB must, when determining a municipal boundary, take into 
account areas of traditional rural communities. As a result, by mentioning traditional 
communities as one of the factors of demarcation, language and culture automatically 
become relevant factors.   
Language also becomes a factor because most traditional communities in multi-ethnic 
provinces are home to a certain ethnic group and are being led by different traditional 
leaders as observed in Malamulele and Vuwani. By considering the different traditional 
communities, this allows the MDB to use of language as a factor. This means that other 
factors which distinguish the areas of traditional community are language and culture.  
Section 25(f) covers the use of ethnicity in demarcating boundaries and by considering 
traditional communities as a factor, linguistic differences will automatically become a 
factor in demarcating municipality. This is because one cannot speak of traditional areas 
without including the language spoken in that area. In as much as traditional communities 
or areas became a factor to be considered by the MDB, language should also be a factor.  
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Section 25(f) therefore provides for the indirect use of ethnicity as a factor in determining 
municipal boundaries in South Africa.  
This study then finds that one of the main reasons why ethnicity was not considered 
directly in the municipal demarcation process was due to South African apartheid 
experiences. As a result, the explicitly use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal 
boundaries was perceived as a return to the apartheid era. This therefore led to the silent 
using of ethnicity in demarcating municipal boundaries in South Africa.  
The use of ethnicity as a factor in demarcating municipal boundaries in South Africa 
should be acknowledged for what it is – identifying communitiess. However, caution 
should be exercised that ethnicity does not become a criterion, as is the case in Ethiopia 
but merely a factor, among others to be considered. This is evident from the lesson and 
experiences learnt from Ethiopia.  
Ethiopia has based its demarcation explicitly on ethnicity as the main criterion and this 
allowed for protection and visibility of ethnic minorities.  This saw the recognition of 
ethnicity in determining regional boundaries in Ethiopia resulting in the accommodation 
of minorities. This is because regions as well as the local government boundaries were 
drawn mainly along ethnic lines from the pre-existing administrative divisions. 
Since 1991, after the overthrow of the Deg dictatorship, the core measure of the new 
government’s state reform in Ethiopia was the remapping of the country explicitly along 
ethno-regional lines. In Ethiopia, ethnicity goes further than regional boundaries 
depending on the level of ethnic diversity. And in most cases when a single ethnic group 
is found to be very tiny, two or more ethnic groups were brought together in one region.  
Pursuant to that there are some definite advantages to the ethno-political dispensation in 
Ethiopia which has existed since 1991: minority groups have acquired visibility and can 
exercise a measure of self-government. They can now use their languages for 
educational purposes and educate members about their community function in the 
administrations and political institutions. All nations, nationalities and peoples are 
represented in the 2nd house of Parliament known as the House of Federations.   
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However, the use of ethnicity in Ethiopia has come at a cost. After ethnic or ethno-
linguistic identity was accorded an organising role in the determination of boundaries and 
policies and new ethnic based local authorities were established, the new political 
dispensation was quickly used as a means to make claims to resources against other 
ethnic groups (especially land and government funding).230 This saw disputes over 
resources in Ethiopia becoming ethnicized. 
As compared to South Africa, Ethiopia has nine regions, six with dominant languages; 
while, South Africa has nine provinces and out of them seven have a dominant language.  
However, the South African Constitution does not recognise the use of ethnicity in 
determining boundaries due to past apartheid experiences and the colonisation period 
when Africans were separated on the basis of ethnicity for the purpose of divide and rule.  
Some of the lessons that Ethiopia teaches South Africa are that using ethnicity alone as 
a factor in determining internal boundaries will result in ethnic tensions between ethnic 
groups and fighting for municipal resources or services. This means that should South 
Africa opt to use ethnicity alone as a factor, municipalities together with the Municipal 
Demarcation Board are likely going to be confronted by violent strikes. It will also result 
in a situation whereby members of the community use ethnicity to demand their own 
municipality away from other ethnic groups as observed in Malamulele. The use of 
ethnicity alone as a factor will lead to repression and ethnic mobilisation among 
communities.   
In comparing the system that is being used by Ethiopia and South Africa when 
determining boundaries, it would be best to look first at the historical background of each 
country. The apartheid experiences in South Africa led to the determination of boundaries 
based on the factors and provisions contained in the Constitution and the Municipal 
Demarcation Act which lead only to the indirect use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal 
boundaries. This means that ethnicity is being indirectly allowed and practiced. 
There are also advantages of using ethnicity as a factor in determining municipal 
boundaries. The recognition of ethnicity must not be viewed as a step closer to dividing 
                                                             
230 Abbink J (2006) 395-396. 
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the country but it should be seen as a response to the problems and tensions faced by 
the Municipal Demarcation Board when carrying out its demarcation functions due to the 
fact that South Africa has different ethnic groups that are situated according to their 
cultures and languages in two provinces, i.e. Limpopo and Mpumalanga. By recognising 
and using ethnicity in the form of cultural communities as a factor in demarcating 
municipalities, these will assist the MDB as communities will be satisfied and people will 
reside according to their ethnic groups. This is because people of the same language and 
cultural background tend to understand each other more and live in peace than in a mixed 
ethnic diversity which eventually results in ethnic conflict.  
It should be noted further that the only disadvantage that was observed in this study is, 
that by using ethnicity in determining municipal boundaries this could result in ethnic 
conflict only if other communities are not provided with proper municipal services by the 
dominating ethnic group as it was alleged by Malamulele community members. 
Therefore, the fact that people identify themselves differently in cultural-historical terms 
does not logically imply that they act or prefer to act on the basis of ethnicity in all contexts 
and political conditions. However, demarcating local government boundaries using 
ethnicity as a factor will sometimes depend of the historical background of the country. 
This study finds that ethnicity is knocking on South Africa’s door and it is bringing ethnic 
tensions especially at the local government level. If we are not careful it will become a 
permanent resident which will trouble both the government and the Municipal 
Demarcation Board. 
The positive side of using ethnicity as a factor is that municipalities will be put in the 
spotlight in determining whether these municipalities are capable of providing service 
delivery or not to all communities within their areas. This study finds that ethnicity will be 
used as a yardstick for assessing the ability of the municipality in taking care of the 
communities and it will reduce the pointing of fingers by other ethnic groups as they will 
have their own municipal offices within their boundaries as seen in Malamulele.  
However, there is a fear that if ethnicity is recognised in determining municipal boundaries 
in South Africa such recognition will result in ethnic conflicts by members of the 
community because no boundary is totally inclusive of one ethnic group. The question of 
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what will happen to internal minorities is pre-occupying the minds of many people. But by 
looking at how the communities in Limpopo Province are situated, language speaks 
volume in differentiating between the three ethnic groups which are situated in that 
province.  There is always a particular ethnic group which is dominating in a particular 
place, such as in Venda only Venda-speaking people are the majority, in Giyani, Tsonga-
speaking people and Polokwane with Sepedi-speaking people.  
Therefore the recognition of ethnicity will not prejudice the minorities as they will be 
incorporated with the boundaries of that particular ethnic group that they find themselves 
in, for example, if a certain minority group happen to find itself within the territory of 
another dominating ethnic group then such minority will form part of the majority and be 
served by the same municipality which is serving the majority. This is to say for example, 
due to work opportunities in Polokwane, there is always a large number of Venda- and 
Tsonga- speaking people leaving their communities to come to Polokwane. Some end up 
building or buying houses there and as a result they end up forming part of the Polokwane 
Local Municipality and even today there is no ethnic conflict which means that people are 
satisfied with the boundaries in which they find themselves in. 
This means that in using ethnicity, there should not be pure ethnic municipalities in South 
Africa. In some instances it could be a factor, in others not. Importantly, it should not be 
an organizing principle such as in Ethiopia, but merely a consideration in the name of 
language and culture 
Based on the above experiences, South Africa should not follow the system followed in 
Ethiopia by making ethnicity the only criterion in determining municipal boundaries 
because that would introduce apartheid planning and will cause ethnic conflicts. However, 
the use of ethnicity in the form of language and culture has a rightful place as a factor, 
among other factors in the demarcation of boundaries. 
This study also recommends that the Municipal Demarcation Act should be amended to 
give effect to the use of ethnicity in demarcating municipal boundaries in South Africa. As 
such, the factors to be taken into account are communities organised around language 
and culture. This means that section 25(f) of the Act should be amended to include factors 
such as culture, tradition and language in areas of traditional communities. 
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